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INTRODUCTION

The modern effort to regulate capital sentencing grew largely out
of concerns about racial discrimination.' Since 1963, when three
Justices dissented from the denial of certiorari in Rudolph v.
Alabama,2 through Furman v. Georgia3 and beyond, the specter of
racial prejudice animated the agenda for reform.4 Efforts within the
Supreme Court to promote racial neutrality in death sentencing
coincided with larger efforts in the wake of the Brown v. Board of

1. See, e.g., STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 247 (2002)
("The idea of mounting a systemic constitutional challenge to the death penalty was an
outgrowth of the civil rights movement."); Robert A. Burt, Disorderin the Court: The Death
Penalty and the Constitution,85 MICH. L. REV. 1741, 1795 (1987) ("From its very beginning,
the charge of racism in the administration of the death penalty was often the text and always
the subtext of the abolitionist litigative campaign.").
2. 375 U.S. 889 (1963) (Goldberg, Douglas & Brennan, JJ., dissenting from the denial
of certiorari). This opinion explicitly raised only the question of whether death was an
appropriate punishment for rape, id. at 889-91, but was originally inspired in part by concern
over racial prejudice in capital sentencing. See, e.g., Interview with Alan M. Dershowitz,
Professor at Harvard Law School, in Cambridge, Mass. (Mar. 2, 1988) [hereinafter
Dershowitz Interview], in APUNISHMENTIN SEARCHOFACRIME 330,331 (Ian Gray & Moira
Stanely eds., 1989) (noting that Justice Goldberg, for whom Dershowitz was clerking that
year, was primarily concerned about racial disparities in the use of the death penalty). The
opinion also spurred lawyers at the NAACP Legal Defense Fund to raise constitutional
challenges to death sentences in rape cases based on racial disparities. See generally
MICHAEL MELTSNER, CRUELAND UNUSUAL: THE SUPREME COURT AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
28-36 (1973) (asserting that the Rudolph dissent helped motivate this strategy); Eric L.
Muller, Note, The Legal Defense Fund's Capital Punishment Campaign: The Distorting
Influence of Death, 4 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 158, 164-68 (1985) (asserting that the Rudolph
dissent was one factor among others that influenced lawyers at the NAACP Legal Defense
Fund to raise the racial-discrimination claims).
3. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
4. See, e.g., Burt, supra note 1, at 1795 (noting that racism was a central concern behind
the efforts at reform); David McCord, Judgingthe Effectiveness of the Supreme Court'sDeath
Penalty JurisprudenceAccordingto the Court'sOwn Goals: Mild Success or MajorDisaster?,
24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 545, 548 (1997) ("[Tlhe Court has had only one primary goal for its
regulation of capital punishment: decreasing overinclusion, with particular interest in
minimizing invidious overinclusion due to racial bias."); Comment, Developments in the
Law-Race and the CriminalProcess,101 HARV. L. REV. 1473, 1608 (1988) ("In Furman,the
risk of racial discrimination underlay the concern about arbitrary and capricious application
of death sentencing statutes.").
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Educationdecision 5 to stem racial discrimination throughout public
institutions .6
The quest in the capital sentencing context has failed,7 although
the primary concern has changed from race-of-defendant to race-ofvictim discrimination.8 Numerous studies conducted in many
states indicate that a defendant is much less likely to receive a
death sentence for the capital murder of a black victim than for
the same murder of a white victim.9 While the results vary with
the study and the state, they reveal a widespread problem. The
Supreme Court's post-Furmandecisions on capital sentencing have
done little to control the influence of unconscious racial biases.10
5. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
6. See David C. Baldus et al., Reflections on the "Inevitability"ofRacialDiscrimination
in CapitalSentencing and the "Impossibility"of Its Prevention,Detection,and Correction,51
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 359, 361 (1994) (noting that the civil rights revolution during the years

after 1954 "manifested itself in a series of judicial decisions and legislative enactments
directed toward the elimination of discrimination from most major governmental
institutions"); see also ROBERTG. McCLoSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME CoURT 165 (Levinson
ed., 3d ed. 2000) ("Whether because of the pressure of the race-relations cases, including
Brown v. Board of Education, or because of a more general cultural interest in
egalitarianism, the Court in the 1960's would engage in the most systematic exploration of
the meaning of equality in American history.").
7. See Scott W. Howe, The FailedCasefor EighthAmendment Regulationofthe CapitalSentencing Trial, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 795, 820-23 (1998) (discussing the evidence of race-ofvictim discrimination in murder cases in Georgia in the late 1970s and concluding that the
Court's post-Furman capital-sentencing doctrine had failed "to promote substantial
consistency in the distribution of death sentences among all factually guilty capital offenders
or even among those actually convicted of capital crimes").
8. The importance of race-of-victim bias in murder cases was perhaps not appreciated
in the pre-Furmanera as much as it is today. Also, some reduction may have occurred in
race-of-defendant discrimination in murder cases in certain regions between the 1960s and
the 1980s. See, e.g., David C. Baldus et al., Arbitrariness and Discrimination in the
Administration of the Death Penalty:A Challenge to State Supreme Courts, 15 STETSON L.
REV. 133, 161 (1986) ("[Tlhe available statistics do not reveal the strong and systematic bias
against black defendants characteristic of pre-Furmansentencing patterns in the South.")
(footnote omitted).
9. See generallyRonald J.Tabak, Is Racism Irrelevant?Or Should the Fairnessin Death
Sentencing Act Be Enacted To Substantially Diminish Racial Discriminationin Capital
Sentencing?, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 777, 778 (1990-91) ("[11n state after state, a
defendant is far more likely to receive the death penalty for a particular capital murder if his
victim is white than if his victim is black.") (footnote omitted); see also infra Part II.
10. According to Carol and Jordan Steiker,
The Supreme Court's death penalty law, by creating an impression of enormous
regulatory effort while achieving negligible regulatory effects; effectively
obscures the true nature of our capital sentencing system, in which the preFurman world of unreviewable sentencer discretion lives on, with much the
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Nonetheless, the Court largely abandoned further efforts toward a
solution with its opinion in McCleskey v. Kemp," in which it
rejected claims based on a study that revealed a high12 risk that
racial prejudice influenced capital selection in Georgia.
The failure to pursue serious remedial actions"3 in the deathpenalty arena has no easy explanation."' The federal government
has made substantial efforts to limit racial discrimination in many
areas, such as voting, housing, employment, and public education."5
Some commentators have argued that the weak effort to remedy the
same consequences in terms of arbitrary and discriminatory sentencing
patterns.
Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades
of ConstitutionalRegulation of CapitalPunishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 355, 436 (1995). See
alsoCharles L. Black, Jr.,Foreword-TheDeathPenalty:ANationalQuestion, 18 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 867, 869 (1985) ("The situation-cosmetically embellished, if you think solemnity in
easily penetrable false pretense to be an embellishment-is just the same as the one the
Court faced and found intolerable in Furman."). But see McCord, supra note 4, at 593
(concluding that the Court's post-Furmanregulatory efforts have been neither an "ineffective
disaster" nor a "complete success," but rather have caused a mild reduction in racial
discrimination) (emphasis omitted).
11. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
12. Id. at 313. A description of the study that provided the basis for the challenge in
McCleskey appears in DAVID C. BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY 40-

228, 306-69 (1990).
13. The decisions in Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28 (1986), and Batson v. Kentucky, 476
U.S. 79 (1986), may have reduced the disparities slightly. Turner held that a black capital
defendant charged with an interracial murder is entitled to advise prospective jurors of the
race of the victim and to inquire about their racial prejudices. See Turner, 476 U.S. at 36-37.
Batson and subsequent cases prohibited the prosecution and the defense from using
peremptory strikes to eliminate prospective jurors on racial grounds. See Batson, 476 U.S.
at 96-98. The effect of Turner is limited by the reluctance of prospective jurors to confess
racial prejudice. The force of Batson is limited by the ability of lawyers to skirt its mandate
with a nonracial reason for a strike.
14. The evidence of disparities continues to raise public controversy. See, e.g., Frank
Green, Bias on Death Penalty?:Landmark '87 Ruling Hasn't Stilled Debate, RICH. TIMESDISPATCH, Apr. 23, 2001, at B1 (noting that Elisabeth Semel, of the American Bar
Association, asserted that "[tihe numbers, when you look at them ... they are shameful"); see
also Bob Herbert, Pullthe Plug, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24,2003, at A31 (contending that the death
penalty, based in part on racial bias in capital selection, is a "rotten edifice" that should be
abolished); Scott Turow, To Kill or Not To Kill: Coming To Terms with CapitalPunishment,
NEW YORKER, Jan. 6, 2003, at 40, 44 (criticizing the use of the death penalty in Illinois in
part based on racial bias in the selection of those to be executed).
15. See, e.g., Baldus et al., supra note 6, at 361 (pointing to the "series of judicial
decisions and legislative enactments directed toward the elimination of discrimination from
most major governmental institutions-voting, employment, housing, public education, and
the delivery of other public services").
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racial disparities in the capital sentencing context is aberrational
in light of these advances.1 6 Although the Supreme Court has not
been alone in failing to act, 7 a few commentators have even said
that history will rank McCleskey with Dred Scott 8 as among the
worst majority opinions in Supreme Court history. 9 Of course,
some deny that the study supporting the challenge in McCleskey
sufficiently established the influence of racial prejudice,20 just as
they deny that any statistical study can adequately prove racial
discrimination in a context as complicated as capital selection.2
Critics of the disparities commonly contend, however, that these
views build on unrealistic demands for certainty.2 2 Indeed, the
16. See id. ("One institution that lags behind in this regard, however, is the criminal
justice system, particularly as it applies to capital punishment.").
17. Since McCleskey, Congress also has eschewed remedial efforts. See id. at 403-04
(noting that two federal legislative proposals, the Racial Justice Act and the Fairness in
Death Sentencing Act, were each defeated on multiple occasions). Likewise, the legislatures
of death-penalty states have rarely required reform.
In 1998, however, Kentucky became the first state to pass legislation to allow death-row
inmates to attack their death sentences based on statistical evidence of racial discrimination.
It remains to be seen how Kentucky courts will apply the law. Entitled the Kentucky Racial
Justice Act, the law does not apply retroactively, requires the capital defendant to attack his
prosecution before trial, requires the defendant to prove by clear and convincing evidence
that "race was the basis of the decision to seek the death penalty" in his case, and allows the
prosecution to rebut the defendant's case with evidence that the prosecution is not based on
race. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 532.300-.309 (Michie 1999).
18. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
19. See, e.g., Hugo Adam Bedau, Someday McCleskey Will Be Death Penalty'sDred Scott,
L.A. TIMEs, May 1, 1987, at Pt. II, 5 ("I predict that in the future, historians will look back
on McCleskey and judge it to be yet another of the Court's great failures-along with Dred
Scott .... "); see also Michael Mello, Executing Rapists: A Reluctant Essay on the Ethics of
Legal Scholarship,4 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 129, 197 (1997) ("Someday, perhaps, the

Supreme Court will bury McCleskey the way it buried another racist opinion from another
era, Dred Scott

....

")

(footnote omitted).

20. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Zant, 580 F. Supp. 338,379 (N.D. Ga. 1984) (concluding that
the data base was flawed and that the statistical methods used to analyze the data were
unreliable).
21. In opposing the proposed federal Racial Justice Act, for example, Senator Orrin Hatch
argued that "[aluthoritative studies simply do not support the conclusion ... that racial
animus is distorting the capital sentencing system." 136 CONG. REC. 12,281 (1990), quoted
in Baldus et al., supra note 6, at 379 n.95. See also Stanley Rothman & Stephen Powers,
Execution by Quota?, PUB. INT., Summer 1994, at 3, 8 ("On the basis of the available
research, one simply cannot conclude that racial discrepancies are a function of racism.").
22. See, e.g., BALDUS ET AL., supra note 12, at 370 (contending that, by suggesting in
McCleskey that "classwide statistical evidence alone was not relevant to the issue of
discrimination in an individual defendant's case[,] ... the Court ... created a nearly

insuperable barrier to proof').
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accumulated research now strongly implies that unconscious racial
bias influences capital selection on a widespread basis, a conclusion
sufficient to raise questions about the lack of more serious remedial
action.23
This Article asks what the Supreme Court might have done
differently to achieve racial neutrality in capital selection, but
concludes that the goal is unattainable as a practical matter, except
through abolition. Many commentators who have criticized the
Court for inaction have avoided the question of how to achieve
racial neutrality.2 4 Other critics have argued that states could
attain racial neutrality, without seriously reducing levels of death
sentencing, by employing monitoring systems grounded in sophisticated statistical techniques. Likewise, Professor Randall Kennedy,
who has written one of the more prominent scholarly criticisms of
26
the disparities, has argued that states could actually "level-up,"
meaning that they could increase the number of death sentences in
racial categories where the sanction is less utilized, particularly
black-on-black murders, while maintaining existing levels of
death sentencing in other racial categories.2 7 In contrast to these
23. See infra Part II.
24. See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 1986 Term-LeadingCases, 101 HARV. L. REV. 119, 155
(1987) (criticizing the McCleskey Court for choosing "to uphold the status quo rather than
remedy injustice" but not specifying what remedial action the Court should have ordered).
25. See, e.g., Baldus et al., supra note 6, at 361-64, 402-05, 418 (arguing for the use of
statistical monitoring and evaluation techniques in accordance with basic approaches
suggested by proposed federal legislation and concluding merely that these reforms could be

implemented "without unduly interfering with the entire capital sentencing process").
26. See Randall L. Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the
Supreme Court, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1388, 1436 (1988) ("[Tlhe level-up solution ... rests on the
assumption that put to a choice, jurisdictions committed to capital punishment would opt to
increase the level of capital sentencing for black-victim murders rather than abolish capital
punishment or lower the level of capital sentencing for white-victim murders.") (footnote
omitted); id. at 1436-39 (arguing that the level-up remedy is a viable solution); see also
RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME AND THE LAW 344-45 (1997) (reiterating that leveling up is
feasible); cf David Dolinko, Supreme Court Reviw--Foreword:How To Criticize the Death
Penalty, 77 J. CraM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 546, 582 (1986) (asserting that, even if the statistical
studies reveal racial prejudice, "such bias may be eliminable without abandoning capital

punishment altogether").
27. Retentionists have not seriously pushed leveling-up as a remedy but have sometimes
used the idea to try to counter arguments for abolition based on racial discrimination. See,
e.g., H.R. REP. No. 103-458, at 14 (1994) (dissenting views on Racial Justice Act, H.R. 4017)
(asserting that if the proposed law were truly aimed at eliminating racial disparities in
capital sentencing, "the solution would be to seek the death penalty in more cases in which
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positions, I conclude that federal efforts to ensure racial neutrality
in capital selection, other than through abolition, could succeed only
by causing both a near meltdown in the use of capital punishment
and an administrative morass for the federal courts.28
In light of this first conclusion, the Article also reexamines the
Eighth Amendment argument that racial discrimination justifies
abolition. The problem of racial prejudice informed the petitioners'
Eighth Amendment arguments for abolition in Furman and its
companion cases 29 and certainly influenced the Furman decision
black defendants murder black victims"); John McAdams, It's Good, and We're Goingto Keep
It: A Response to Ronald Tabak, 33 CONN. L. REV. 819, 827 (2001) (arguing that no basis
exists to prefer abolition rather than leveling-up as a remedy for racial disparities, so that
"the racial disparity argument is a pretext, not a genuine reason for opposing the death
penalty"); Ernestvan den Haag, The UltimatePunishment:ADefense, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1662,
1665 n.14 (1986) [hereinafter van den Haag, The Ultimate Punishment] ("For most
abolitionists, the discrimination argument ... is nondecisive: they would favor abolition even
if there could be no racial discrimination.") (citation omitted); cf Ernest van den Haag, The
Death Penalty Once More, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 957, 960-61, 961 n.23 (1985) (arguing in a
footnote that "the discrimination against black victims is invidious and should be corrected"
while asserting in the text that the race-of-victim discrimination favors black murderers so
as to undermine the grounds for complaint). However, they have also repeatedly opposed
federal legislation requiring racial neutrality in capital selection, which suggests that they
do not believe that leveling-up or re-selection is practical. See, e.g., KENNEDY, supranote 26,
at 347 ("The inference [opponents of the Racial Justice Act] draw is that the total neglect of
the leveling-up alternative by supporters of the [Act] evidences a concern not so much with
racial justice as with impeding the administration of capital punishment by all available
means.").

28. As a matter of theory, of course, leveling-up can eliminate racially disproportionate
distributions. See, e.g., Howe, supranote 7, at 860 ("[Tlhe disproportionately low distribution
of capital sentences against killers of black vitims could be solved through increased use of
the death penalty in black-victim cases.") (footnote omitted); Scott W. Howe, The Troubling
Influence ofEquality in ConstitutionalCriminalProcedure:FromBrownto Miranda, Furman
and Beyond, 54 VAND. L. REV. 359, 443 n.410 (2001) ("(A] proportionate distribution
according to the race of the victim can be achieved through increasing the use of the death
penalty in black victim cases .... "). We will see, however, that all proposed remedies to
eliminate the disparities are impractical, see infraPart III, and, further, that the disparities
themselves are only symptoms of a deeper Eighth Amendment problem that leveling-up
would not address. See infra Part IV.B.
29. See Brief for Petitioner at 54, Aikens v. California, 406 U.S. 813 (1972) (No. 68-5027),
reprintedin 73 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 401 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1975)
("Whether it happen by accident or design that penalties of this sort fall most furiously upon
the poor and friendless and upon racial minorities, the supposed 'acceptance' of the penalty
is nonetheless a product of the outcast nature of those who bear the brunt of it."); MELTSNER,
supra note 2, at 269 (noting Professor Anthony Amsterdam's argument in Aikens that the
proper measure of Eighth Amendment constitutionality should focus on whether society
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striking down capital punishment as it then existed.3" All but two
of the Justices in Furman rejected abolition," however, and the
Court subsequently has declared consistently that procedural
safeguards can satisfy constitutional demands for nonarbitrariness
in capital selection. 2 The racial-discrimination argument for Eighth
Amendment abolition was never developed extensively and is now
largely forgotten.33
would accept a death penalty administered in consistent fashion).
30. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 364 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring)
(noting that studies suggested race-based discrimination as one reason for a high level of
executions among black defendants).
31. Only Justices Brennan and Marshall concluded that the death penalty was altogether
unconstitutional. See Furman,408 U.S. at 305 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("The punishment
of death is ... 'cruel and unusual,' and the States may no longer inflict it as a punishment for
crimes."); id. at 359 (Marshall, J., concurring) ("There is no rational basis for concluding that
capital punishment is not excessive. It therefore violates the Eighth Amendment.") (footnote
omitted). The three other Justices who concurred in the majority decision each found thenexisting systems of capital selection inadequate but did not declare capital punishment per
se unconstitutional. See id. at 256-57 (Douglas, J., concurring) ("[T]hese discretionary
statutes are ... pregnant with discrimination and discrimination is an ingredient not
compatible with the idea of equal protection of the laws that is implicit in the ban on 'cruel
and unusual' punishments."); id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring) ("[O]f all the people
convicted of rapes and murders in 1967 and 1968, many just as reprehensible as these, the
petitioners are among a capriciously selected random handful upon whom the sentence of
death has in fact been imposed.") (footnotes omitted); id. at 313 (White, J., concurring) ("IT]he
death penalty is exacted with great infrequency even for the most atrocious crimes and ...
there is no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which it is imposed from the
many cases in which it is not.").
32. In McCleskey, the Court stated,
Because McCleskey's sentence was imposed under Georgia sentencing
procedures that focus discretion 'on the particularized nature of the crime and
the particularized characteristics of the individual defendant,' ... we lawfully
may presume that McCleskey's death sentence was not 'wantonly and
freakishly' imposed ... and thus that the sentence is not disproportionate within
any recognized meaning under the Eighth Amendment.
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279,308 (1987) (citations omitted); see also id. at 313 ("Despite
these imperfections, our consistent rule has been that constitutional guarantees are met
when 'the mode [for determining guilt or punishment] itself has been surrounded with
safeguards to make it as fair as possible.') (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
33. During the post-Furman era, the argument for Eighth Amendment abolition based
on racial discrimination was sometimes presented, though in truncated form, by Justices
Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun. Discussion about judicial abolition has generally been
sparse, with some noteworthy exceptions regarding arguments both favoring and opposing
an abolitionist interpretation of the Eighth Amendment. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE
TEMPTING OF AMERICA 213-14 (1990) (contending that the abolitionist argument is defeated
by language in other amendments indicating that the original understanding was that
capital punishment was not cruel and unusual punishment); RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S
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This Article explains why the racial-discrimination problem
should challenge prevailing thought about judicial abolition. The
Eighth Amendment measure for when a punishment will be
constitutionally banned focuses heavily on whether a societal
consensus has developed against the sanction. 4 The argument
against the death penalty faces difficulty under this test
because many states still strongly support capital punishment.3 5
LAW 301 (1996) (contending that language in other amendments contemplating capital
punishment "merely confirms what the framers themselves thought" and "cannot assist
judges any more than the fact that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment accepted
segregated schools assists in understanding the equal protection clause"); ANTONIN SCALIA,
A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 145 (1997) ("[It is entirely clear that capital punishment,
which was widely in use in 1791, does not violate the abstract moral principle of the Eighth
Amendment."); LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN & MARK V. TUSHNET, REMNANTS OF BELIEF 154
(1996) ("Capital punishment might violate the Constitution's general prohibition even if its
authors did not recognize this fact.").
34. See, e.g., Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361,380 (1989) (plurality opinion) (rejecting
challenge to the use of the death penalty against those who murder when sixteen or
seventeen years of age and pointing to insufficient evidence of a societal consensus against
such application of the sanction).
Polling data regarding support for the death penalty has been summarized as follows:
Between 1977 and 1998 the percentage of those polled who favored the death
penalty for murder fluctuated between 66 and 76 percent. The percentage who
opposed the death penalty fluctuated between 19 and 28 percent. (Some people
report no opinion, so the percentages do not add to 100.) This was a degree of
support consistently higher than at any time since the first polls on the issue
were taken in the 1930s. After a long period of growing skepticism, public
opinion had quickly and decisively swung back toward capital punishment.
BANNER, supra note 1, at 275; see also Samuel R. Gross, Update:American Public Opinion
on the Death Penalty-It'sGetting Personal,83 CORNELL L. REV. 1448, 1449 (1998) (noting
that the best annual public opinion poll indicates that support for the death penalty for
murder ranged from 70% to 76%between 1982 and 1996 and that these figures "represent[
a very high level of support for the death penalty and a great increase over earlier decades").
35. As of January 30,2004, the total number of executions since 1976 and the death-row
populations for each of the relevant U.S. jurisdictions were as follows:
Executions
Since 1976
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)

Texas
Virginia
Oklahoma
Missouri
Florida
Georgia
N. Carolina
S. Carolina

321
90
73
61
58
34
31
29

Current
Death Row
458
27
106
60
381
114
205
76
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The racial-discrimination argument, however, views the evidence
of societal acceptance of capital punishment as itself molded by
unconscious racial biases and denies that such evidence can be the
measure of constitutionality. Instead, the racial-discrimination
argument contemplates that the decision about abolition must
confront the discrimination problem openly. According to this view,
the appropriate question is whether the Supreme Court can
implement and enforce measures to ensure that capital selection,
even in the aggressive death-penalty states, will be essentially free
of the influence of racial biases. This Article shows why that task
is not feasible.
9) Alabama
10) Louisiana
11) Arkansas
12) Arizona
13) Delaware
14) Illinois
15) Ohio
16) Indiana
17) California
18) Nevada
19) Utah
20) Mississippi
21) Washington
22) Maryland
23) Nebraska
24) Pennsylvania
25) Federal
26) Kentucky
27) Montana
28) Oregon
29) Colorado
30) Idaho
31) New Mexico
32) Tennessee
33) Wyoming
34) New Jersey
35) Connecticut
36) Nebraska
37) U.S. Military
38) New York
39) South Dakota
40) Kansas

28
27
26
22
13
12
11
11
10
10
6
6
4
3
3
3
3
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

196
92
40
128
21
8
213
39
634
89
10
69
11
12
7
237
28
37
5
31
3
21
2
104
1
15
7
7
7
5
4
7

See DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., FACTS ABOUT THE DEATH PENALTY 2-3, available at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/FactSheet.pdf (last updated Mar. 30, 2004).
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This Article also provides a larger theory about the Eighth
Amendment to explain why racial discrimination in capital
selection matters. The explanation builds on a deserts-limitation
principle. The core restriction that the Eighth Amendment imposes
on the use of capital punishment is that only offenders who deserve
death should receive that sanction. 3' The Supreme Court's capitalsentencing doctrine builds on this principle, although the Court has
usually avoided any suggestion that the Eighth Amendment speaks
to the substantive standard that defines who is death eligible. The
Court has stated that Furman and its progeny simply call for
"reasonable consistency" or "nonarbitrariness" in the use of capital
punishment.37 This empty mandate has not been taken seriously
even as a proscription against racial prejudice, perhaps in part
because it does not clarify why unconscious racial bias should
matter enough to reverse death sentences. After all, as commentators have frequently noted, murderers who deserve death do not
deserve death any less simply because other similarly situated
murderers are spared. 8 Yet, when the Eighth Amendment is
36. See infra text accompanying notes 85-86; see also Howe, supra note 7, at 829-35
(explaining why this principle comports with the Eighth Amendment and best explains the
Supreme Court's capital-sentencing doctrine); Howe, supra note 28, at 438-42.
37. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,222 (1976) (White, J., concurring) (asserting
that, after Furman, a death sentencing scheme must "result in death sentences being
imposed with reasonable consistency"); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303 (1976)
(plurality opinion) (asserting that Furmanhad mandated that states replace "arbitrary and
wanton jury discretion with objective standards to guide, regularize, and make rationally
reviewable the process for imposing a sentence of death"); WELSH S. WHITE, THE DEATH
PENALTY IN THE NINETIES: AN EXAMINATION OF THE MODERN SYSTEM OF CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT 135 (1991) ("Furmaninvalidated a system of capital punishment that produced
arbitrary results."); Stephen P. Garvey, Death-Innocenceand the Law of HabeasCorpus, 56
ALB. L. REV. 225,228 (1992) ("[T]he evil condemned in Furmanhas subsequently come to be
identified with inconsistency in the way the penalty was administered.") (footnote omitted).
38. See, e.g., RANDALL COYNE& LYNENTEROTH, CAPITAL PUNISHMENTAND THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS 198 (2001) ("Death penalty supporters respond to arguments of racial bias in capital
cases by arguing, principally, that society's interest in retribution, justice and concern for the
victims of the crime and their families trump equal protection concerns."); SEIDMAN &
TUSHNET, supra note 33, at 160 (asking, "[i]fAllen [an African American] really deserves to
die, why should he be spared simply because Bob [a white man] has wrongly beaten the
system?" and concluding that "[siparing Allen in these circumstances seems to violate the
schoolyard maxim that two wrongs don't make a right"); Richard 0. Lempert, Desert and
Deterrence:An Assessment ofthe MoralBases of the Case for CapitalPunishment, 79 MICH.
L. REV. 1177, 1178-79 (1981) ("Retributivists justify the death penalty despite substantial
evidence that it has been inequitably applied by arguing that inequitable application is not
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understood to impose a deserts limitation on the use of capital
punishment, it becomes clearer why unconscious racial discrimination matters greatly. If we recognize the capital-sentencing inquiry
itself as an effort mandated by the Eighth Amendment to ensure
that death-sentenced offenders deserve death, the evidence of racial
discrimination reveals the pervasive inability of decision makers to
determine deserts appropriately. The claim that those who receive
death sentences deserve them no longer trumps concern about
racial discrimination. 9
This Article proceeds in four stages. Part I explains the central
characteristics of post-Furman capital selection that promote the
influence of racial bias. Part II summarizes the evidence that racial
bias has continued to widely plague capital selection despite the
Supreme Court's post-Furman efforts. Part III asks whether the
Supreme Court should have pursued an alternative regulatory
approach, but concludes that racial discrimination in capital
selection is ineradicable by federal regulation except through
methods that would cause both minimal use of capital punishment
and an administrative nightmare for the federal courts. Part IV
then develops the argument that unconscious racial prejudice in
capital selection justifies judicial abolition. The Article concludes
that the racial-discrimination problem can justify abolition under
the Eighth Amendment.
I. CHARACTERISTICS OF POST-FURMAN CAPITAL SELECTION THAT
PROMOTE THE INFLUENCE OF RACIAL BIAS

Capital selection in the post-Furman era still lends itself to the
influence of racial discrimination by decision makers who are
almost all white.4 ° Four factors play a central role: (1) the broad
inherent in the penalty, and that it is better that some receive their just deserts, however
biased the sample executed, than that none do."); van den Haag, The Ultimate Punishment,
supra note 27, at 1663 ("Maldistribution of any punishment among those who deserve it is
irrelevant to its justice or morality.").
39. See Lempert, supra note 38, at 1178 ("TIhe just desert theory [does not] allow
personal characteristics such as sex, race, or national status to dominate indicia of moral
culpability in determining punishment.") (footnote omitted).
40. See Jeffrey J. Pokorak, Probing the Capital Prosecutor'sPerspective: Race of the
DiscretionaryActors, 83 CORNELLL. REV. 1811,1817 tbl.1 (1998) (noting that the percentage
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application of the death penalty to non-negligent homicide; (2) the
decentralized decision making exercised by prosecutors and capitalsentencing juries; (3) the extreme deference that courts extend to
prosecutors on basic matters such as charging and plea bargaining;
and (4) the expansive discretion given to capital sentencers. This
Part briefly explores how these four factors combine to create a
system in which unconscious racial discrimination may easily affect
decisions, and sets the stage for later discussion showing why racial
influences in capital selection elude control.
A. BroadApplicability of Death Penalty
The broad applicability of the death penalty promotes the
influence of racial prejudice by extending discretionary decision
making to cases in which the propriety of the death penalty is
unclear. Under Supreme Court doctrine, the death penalty can
apply to most criminal homicides, and death-penalty states
typically make the death penalty a possibility for most murders.4
The result is significant variation in the propriety of the death
penalty among potential capital cases. Making the death penalty
possible where its propriety is unclear creates the potential that
racial bias will affect outcomes.
By historical standards, the death penalty is now constitutional
for only a small group of crimes.4 2 The Supreme Court has outlawed
the sanction for typical, nonhomicidal felonies, such as rape or
robbery, where no one dies."3 The Justices have also proscribed the
of death-penalty decision makers who were white in all death-penalty states except New
Mexico was well over 90% and, in most, was 100%); see also Stephen B. Bright,
Discrimination,Death andDenial: The Tolerance of RacialDiscriminationin Inflictionofthe
Death Penalty, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 433, 454-57 (1995) (noting that capital-sentencing

juries are often entirely white).
41. See infra text accompanying note 52.
42. See BANNER, supra note 1, at 5 (noting that Colonial America employed the death
penalty for a large variety of crimes which are not punishable by death today).
43. In Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977), a plurality of four justices concluded that

death is always a disproportionate punishment for "a rape not involving the taking of life."
Id. at 599 (plurality opinion). Three other Justices agreed with the judgment, two on broader
grounds and one on narrower grounds. Justices Brennan and Marshall each separately
concurred on grounds that the death penalty is altogether unconstitutional. See id. at 600
(Brennan, J., concurring); id. (Marshall, J., concurring). Justice Powell concluded that the
death penalty was not always unconstitutional for rape, although it was excessive on the
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penalty for a small number of defendants who fall within the
fringes of the felony-murder rule through vicarious liability
doctrine. 44 The Court has also banned the execution of previously
death-sentenced inmates who are insane, 45 defendants who were
under sixteen at the time of their offenses, except in extraordinary
circumstances, 464 and only recently, those who are retarded.4 v
States must also further reduce the group subject to the death
penalty, but this further narrowing is often minimal. 4 State
legislatures must reduce the group by articulating "aggravating
circumstances," at least one of which ajury must find as a prerequisite to a death sentence.4 9 However, the Court has not prohibited
states from specifying a long list of aggravating factors that
together cover almost all murders.' Hence, this narrowing mandate
does not confine the use of the death penalty to a small subsection
51
of the worst murderers.
particular facts in Coker. See id. at 603 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
44. In Enmund v. Florida,458 U.S. 782 (1982), the Court outlawed the death penalty for
felony murderers who did not intend to, attempt to, or actually kill. See id. at 797 (concluding
that death is excessive punishment "for the robber who, as such, does not take human life").
On the other hand, in Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987), the Court authorized the death
penalty for those within the Enmund exception who demonstrated reckless indifference to
human life and were major participants in the underlying felony. See id. at 158 (holding that
"major participation in the felony committed, combined with reckless indifference to human
life, is sufficient to satisfy the Enmund culpability requirement").
45. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
46. The Court has not articulated an age below which a state may never execute a minor.
In Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988), however, Justice O'Connor's decisive,
concurring opinion concluded that the death penalty was excessive for fifteen-year-old
offenders where a state's legislation failed to specify an intent to execute such young
offenders. See id. at 857-58 (O'Connor, J., concurring injudgment) (reasoning that those who
were under sixteen when they offended should not be executed where it was not apparent
that the legislature had carefully considered the application of the death penalty to them).
The Court has upheld the execution of sixteen- and seventeen-year-old offenders. See
Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) ("We discern neither a historical nor a
modern societal consensus forbidding the imposition of capital punishment on any person
who murders at 16 or 17 years of age.").
47. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
48. See, e.g., Steiker & Steiker, supra note 10, at 384 (concluding that the special
circumstances in the California statute do not significantly narrow the availability of the
death penalty in murder cases).
49. See Howe, supranote 7, at 808-10 (discussing the narrowing requirement).
50. See id. at 816-17 ("[T]he Court has never demanded through the narrowing mandate
that capital-sentencing systems substantially circumscribe the group subject to execution.").
51. See, e.g., Steiker & Steiker, supra note 10, at 384 (noting that neither the Georgia nor
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Most death-penalty states allow the capital sanction for a very
broad array of murders. Some differences exist in the definitions of
capital crimes.5 2 For example, in Georgia, any person convicted of
simple murder may face a death-sentencing hearing,5" while in
Louisiana, the capital statute includes only certain aggravated
murders.5 4 Nonetheless, in general, "death eligibility remains
remarkably broad-indeed, nearly as broad as under the expansive
statutes characteristic of the pre-Furmanera."5 5
The broad application of the capital sanction probably encourages
the influence of racial bias, because racial bias probably matters
most in cases that are not on the extremes.5" Although categorizing

the California statutes, which the Court has upheld, limit the death penalty to a "small subclass").
52. State laws also vary in such matters as whether the jury must find the existence of
an aggravating factor unanimously and what standard of proof should apply in deciding
whether the factor exists. For a summary of variations among states on these and other
aspects of the capital sentencing decision, see McCord, supra note 4, at 561-67.
53. See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-1(d) (2003) (defining murder and stating that a person
convicted of murder "shall be punished by death or by imprisonment for life").
At a sentencing hearing in Georgia, the jury need only find one aggravating circumstance
from a list that covers virtually all murders. The list includes ten possible aggravating
factors, several of which are extremely broad. See GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30 (2003). This
statute has remained essentially unchanged since its enactment shortly after Furman,and
the Baldus Study concluded that "more than ninety percent of the pre-Furman death
sentences [in Georgia] were imposed in cases whose facts would have made them deatheligible under Georgia's post-Furman statute." BALDUS ET AL., supra note 12, at 102.
54. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:30 (2003) (defining first-degree murder as the "killing
of a human being" committed in one of seven specified circumstances).
At a sentencing hearing in Louisiana, however, the jury need only find at least one of
twelve aggravating factors that together will cover most capital offenses. See LA. CODE CRIM.
PROC. ANN. art. 905.4 (2003) (setting forth twelve aggravating circumstances).
55. See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 10, at 373.
56. See, e.g., Baldus et al., supra note 6, at 366 (noting that the results of the Baldus
Study in Georgia revealed that "among the moderately aggravated cases-the so-called 'midrange' of cases-in which the facts neither called out strongly for life ... nor for death ... the
race-of-victim disparities were much greater") (footnote omitted); Arnold Barnett, Some
DistributionPatternsfor the Georgia Death Sentence, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1327, 1350
(1985) (concluding that race-of-victim effects are strongest in mid-range cases after
classifying cases in the Baldus data set based on three principal criteria).
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the "deathworthiness" v of capital offenders is highly subjective,5 8
some researchers have contended that in cases they view as being
in the mid-range of aggravation, racial disparities are pronounced.5 9
However, in cases they classify as being in the most-aggravated and
the least-aggravated ranges, racial disparities are diminished.6 °
Thus, they have contended that the influence of racial bias will
most often matter where the proper outcome is not otherwise
clear. 6 '
B. DecentralizedDecision Makers
Capital selection also involves highly decentralized decision
making, which generally forecloses a sense of responsibility by
individual arbiters for system-wide racial disparities. The most
important decision makers are the prosecutors who determine
whether to pursue the death penalty and the sentencers who
ultimately decide whether to impose that sanction. 2 These actors
operate in local contexts and with minimal, if any, coordination,
which gives them little perspective or control regarding state-wide
sentencing patterns.

57. See Phyllis L. Crocker, Concepts of Culpabilityand Deathworthiness:Differentiating
Between Guilt and Punishment in Death Penalty Cases, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 21, 26 (1997)
("Deathworthiness is broad enough to include all of the factors relevant to the sentencing
decision: the defendant's culpability for the crime, as well as his character, record, and
background, and the circumstances and character of the murder.").
58. See infra Part I.D.
59. See, e.g., Baldus et al., supra note 6, at 410 ("As was the case in our Georgia study,
the New Jersey data also show a concentration of race effects in the mid-range of cases in
which the ability to exercise discretion is the greatest.") (footnote omitted).
60. See BALDUS ETAL., supranote 12, at 145 ("[W~e found that, when the crime involved
was either extremely aggravated or comparatively free from aggravating circumstances, the
choice between a life and a death sentence was relatively clear; and, regardless of racial
factors, Georgia prosecutors and juries responded accordingly.").
61. See, e.g., id. (reiterating the theory of Kalven and Zeisel that "juries were most
influenced by legally irrelevant or impermissible considerations when the evidence of guilt
was ambiguous and the case was close"); Kennedy, supranote 26, at 1430-31 n.196 ("Officials
feel most ambivalent with respect to this [mid-range] category, thus providing an opening
for racial bias to enter.").
62. See Hans Zeisel, Race Bias in the Administrationof the DeathPenalty: The Florida
Experience, 95 HARV. L. REV. 456, 466 (1981) ("[Tlhe prosecutor has overpowering control
over the flow of offenders to death row."); infra Part I.D (discussing sentencers).
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District Attorneys in death-penalty states usually serve at the
county level or in an area that includes only a few counties. For
example, in Georgia, there are 46 District Attorneys; in Missouri,
there are 115; and, in Texas, there are 148.63 These officials have
enormous influence over which potential capital defendants will
proceed toward a death sentence and which will be spared. They
decide whether to charge a supposed murderer with a capital crime,
whether to allow a charged capital defendant to plead guilty to a
lesser, noncapital offense, and whether to continue to seek the
death penalty after a conviction on a capital charge.6 ' In making
these decisions, local District Attorneys act with great independ5
ence.6
Sentencers in capital cases also differ for each case and act
independently. Juries rather than judges serve as the capital
sentencer in most death-penalty jurisdictions, and the Constitution
now guarantees a capital defendant that a jury will determine the
existence of the aggravating circumstances defining death eligibility. 6 Juries represent a local community and, even in large urban
areas, rarely include members who have served on another capital
case.
Localized, independent decision making reduces the odds that the
arbiters will know the details of system-wide sentencing patterns
or care about them. In deciding how to proceed in a capital case, a
prosecutor will lack the information needed to compare the case to
all other potential capital prosecutions in the state. Even if the
prosecutor could make such a comparison, he probably would not
weigh the information heavily because he would likely view his
63. See Pokorak, supra note 40, at 1817 tbl.1.
64. See Zeisel, supra note 62, at 466 (discussing these "three crucial opportunities" for
the prosecutor "to intervene in the criminal process").
65. Some states provide by statute that the state Attorney General has general
supervisory authority over District Attorneys, but the parameters of that authority typically
are unclear. See, e.g., Criminal Justice Act of 1970, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:17B-98, 103
(describing the New Jersey Attorney General as "chief law enforcement officer of the State"
and authorizing her to "maintain a general supervision over ... county prosecutors with a

view to obtaining effective and uniform enforcement of the criminal laws").
66. In Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), the Supreme Court held that the
Constitution guarantees the capital defendant a jury determination regarding the existence
of any facts defining death eligibility. Of the thirty-eight death-penalty states, judges had
served, until recently, as the sentencers in nine of them. See id. at 608 n.6.
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small subset of cases as contributing little to any state-wide
patterns. 7 A sentencing jury is even less likely to know the details
of state-wide, death-sentencing patterns or to feel responsible for
them. 68 The result is a system in which the actual decision makers
lack a sense of ownership, if they even have awareness, of the
problem that their collective decisions produce.
C. ProsecutorialDiscretion
The great deference shown by courts to the decisions of prosecutors on whether to pursue the death penalty also promotes the
influence of racial biases.6 9 A prosecutor need not seek a death
sentence whenever the evidence would support it, which explains
why the vast majority of death-eligible defendants each year are
spared. 70 In addition, in death-eligible cases where the prosecutor
pursues the death penalty, the courts will not invalidate the
67. There are exceptions. For example, the Harris County, Texas, District Attorney's
Office, which encompasses Houston, is responsible for prosecuting many of the cases
resulting in death sentences in Texas. See Bright, supra note 40, at 434 & n.10 (noting that
Harris County, Texas, has sentenced more people to death and prosecuted more cases
resulting in executions than most states).
68. Evidence about state-wide racial disparities is not relevant to the capital sentencer's
decision in a particular case. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality opinion)
(holding that a defendant is entitled to present any evidence concerning his character, record,
or crime).
69. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 199 (1976) (plurality opinion) (upholding
post-Furman Georgia capital selection system against claim by defendant that the system
is arbitrary, in part, because "the state prosecutor has unfettered authority to select those
persons whom he wishes to prosecute for a capital offense and to plea bargain with them").
70. See, e.g., James S. Liebman, The OverproductionofDeath, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 2030,
2052 (2001) ("Since Furman,an average of about 300 of the approximately 21,000 homicides
committed in the United States each year have resulted in a death sentence.") (footnote
omitted).
Prosecutors are free to charge a defendant with a noncapital crime although the evidence
might support a capital charge. See, e.g., Pokorak, supra note 40, at 1813 (noting that
prosecutors "enjoy almost complete freedom" not to charge a death-eligible defendant with
a capital crime). They may also agree to allow a charged capital defendant to plead guilty to
a charge that will avoid a death sentence. See, e.g., WHITE, supra note 37, at 55 (discussing
the widespread practice of allowing most capital defendants to plead guilty to a noncapital
offense). They are also free in many jurisdictions to decline to seek a death sentence after a
defendant has been convicted of a capital crime. The Baldus Study revealed, for example,
that in Georgia in the late 1970s, prosecutors decided not to pursue the death penalty in twothirds of the cases after securing a conviction on a capital offense. See BALDUS ET AL., supra
note 12, at 327 tbl.56.
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conviction or sentence simply because the prosecutor has pursued
a selective enforcement policy that reprieves other offenders who
may seem similarly situated.7 '
Judicial deference to basic prosecutorial decisions, such as
whether to pursue the death penalty, stems from the belief that
courts are ill-equipped to decide such questions. As the Supreme
Court has noted, "[sluch factors as the strength of the case, the
prosecution's general deterrence value, the Government's enforcement priorities, and the case's relationship to the Government's
overall enforcement plan are not readily susceptible to the kind of
analysis the courts are competent to undertake."7 2 This judicial
deference means that prosecutors may reprieve a defendant from
a potential death sentence for a plethora of reasons, including
merely the desire to show mercy. 7' Because the decisions fall to the
subjective judgment of the prosecutor, potential abounds for
unconscious racial biases to influence outcomes.
The Equal Protection Clause ostensibly prohibits racial discrimination by prosecutors, but defendants almost never succeed in
challenging a prosecutor's decisions on this basis. To prevail, the
defendant must prove purposeful discrimination based on race
or a similarly odious ground.7 4 A claim of unconscious discrimination will not suffice.7 5 Most defendants lack any direct evidence
that a prosecutor had a purpose to discriminate based on race. Only
through a presumption grounded on the prosecutor's decisions in
various cases could these defendants make headway in establishing
a discriminatory purpose. However, in part because of the many
accepted grounds for selective prosecution, courts have declined to
find a presumption of racial discrimination even where a pattern of
71. See Barry Latzer, The Failureof ComparativeProportionalityReview of CapitalCases
(With Lessons From New Jersey), 64 ALB. L. REV. 1161, 1188 (2001) ("[E]ven a purposeful

selective enforcement policy does not deny equal protection, unless it is based on an invidious
standard.") (footnote omitted).
72. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985).
73. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 199 (plurality opinion) ("Nothing in any of our cases suggests
that the decision to afford an individual defendant mercy violates the Constitution.").
74. See, e.g., Latzer, supra note 71, at 1190 ("To establish an Equal Protection violation,
the challenger would have to prove purposeful discrimination on a racial or some other
I
similarly forbidden basis.") (footnote omitted).
75. See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 26, at 1404 ("The Court insists that only 'purposeful'
discrimination violates the equal protection clause.") (footnote omitted).
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prosecutorial decision making in the same county produces racially
disparate outcomes.7 6 Consequently, prosecutors can make decisions
influenced by unconscious, racial empathies, or even purposeful
racial discrimination, if kept secret, without
fear of reversal.
o
D. Sentencer Discretion
Capital sentencers also have great discretion, which promotes the
influence of racial biases in their decisions. In all states, a jury
must find the defendant's guilt and the presence of an aggravating
factor as prerequisites to a death verdict.7 7 However, Supreme
Court doctrine requires no further guidance to the sentencer
regarding whether to impose a death sentence.7 8 Although states
vary on what further guidance they provide, some give virtually
none.7 9 The sentencer's discretion about how to choose between
death and life imprisonment is essentially "unbridled." ° Even in
states that purport to provide guidance, the directions are little
more than vague commands to weigh aggravating against mitigating factors.8 '
76. See generally John H. Blume et al., Post-McCleskey RacialDiscriminationClaims in
Capital Cases, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1771, 1794-97 (1998) (discussing various decisions in
which lower courts declined to find a presumption of racial discrimination, despite singlecounty studies showing racially disparate outcomes from prosecutorial decisions in capital
cases).
77. See, e.g., Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862,877 (1983) (concluding that the requirement
that the jury find an aggravating circumstance in addition to guilt served to "genuinely
narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and ... reasonably justify the
imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of
murder").
78. See Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 244 (1988):
In Zant v. Stephens ... we upheld a sentence of death imposed pursuant to the
Georgia capital sentencing statute, under which "the finding of an aggravating
circumstance does not play any role in guiding the sentencing body in the
exercise of its discretion, apart from its function of narrowing the class of
persons convicted of murder who are eligible for the death penalty."
Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Zant, 462 U.S. at 874).
79. An example is Georgia's system, which is discussed in Zant, 462 U.S. at 865-74.
80. Id. at 875; see, e.g., Steiker & Steiker, supra note 10, at 390 (noting that "all deathpenalty schemes presently permit unconstrained consideration of mitigating evidence').
81. See, e.g., Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242,248 (1976) (noting that the Florida statute
provides that "[alt the conclusion of the hearing the jury is directed to consider '[w]hether
sufficient mitigating circumstances exist ... which outwiegh the aggravating circumstances
found to exist; and ... [blased on these considerations, whether the defendant should be
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While states can limit a sentencer's discretion to choose death,
Supreme Court doctrine requires that the capital sentencer retain
expansive discretion to reject death. In Lockett v. Ohio, 2 the Court
ruled that a capital sentencer must remain free to reject the death
penalty based on any evidence that the defendant presents relating
to his character, record, or crime.8 3 The Lockett rule ensures not
only that the sentencer has the discretion to choose a life sentence
but that the defendant can present a broad array of evidence to try
to persuade the sentencer in his favor.8 4 Any evidence about the
defendant's background or crime that helps explain why he might
have committed the offense or why he otherwise should live falls
within the rule.8 5 The only kinds of death-sentencing systems that
can enable sentencers to reject the death penalty based on all such
evidence presented are those in which the jury retains essentially
unbridled power to reject the death penalty at a final stage of
decision making.8

sentenced to life [imprisonment] or death.'").
82. 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (plurality opinion).
83. Id. at 604 (plurality opinion) ("[W]e conclude that the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments require that the sentencer, in all but the rarest kind of capital case, not be
precluded from considering, as a mitigatingfactor, any aspect of a defendant's character or
record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for
a sentence less than death.") (footnotes omitted); see also id. at 620-21 (Marshall, J.,
concurring) (noting that the Ohio statute "wholly fails to recognize the unique individuality
of every criminal defendant").
84. Professor Louis Bilionis has provided examples ofmitigating evidence under Lockett:
Mitigating evidence might include, for instance, evidence that a death sentence
would be unjust because the defendant's personal responsibility for the offense
is lessened by youth, stunted intellectual and emotional growth, mental
retardation or impaired capacity, mental or emotional disturbance, provocation
by others, insanity, the influence of alcohol or drugs at the time of the offense,
or shared or limited participation in the actual crime. Lockett's definition of
mitigating evidence also would embrace evidence in support of a claim that the
defendant suffered tragic or horrible circumstances in his or her formative
years, such as abuse, neglect, poverty, or domestic turbulence ....
Louis D. Bilionis, MoralAppropriateness,CapitalPunishment, and the Lockett Doctrine, 82
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 283, 302-04 (1991) (footnotes omitted).
85. See, e.g., WHITE, supra note 37, at 76 ("According to defense attorneys who specialize
in capital cases, the best way to be successful at the penalty stage is to present a dramatic
psychohistory of the defendant to the jury.").
86. See Howe, supra note 28, at 409 ("The kinds of systems that will pass muster are
those, like the general sort maintained in Georgia and Florida, that require essentially
standardless capital sentencing.").
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The conferral of expansive and essentially standardless sentencer
discretion on predominantly white sentencers8 7 gives substantial
room for the influence of racial bias.88 Without fairly precise guiding
standards, sentencers must rely on their own subjective judgments
in deciding when to reprieve a capital defendant. Although
sentencers may not typically harbor conscious racial prejudices,
they may often subconsciously hold negative preconceptions about
minorities8 9 or at least have greater empathy for members of their
own race than members of other races.9" The existence of these
preconceptions can easily influence judgments that call for decision
makers to exercise discretion.
Broad sentencer discretion may also exacerbate the tendency of
prosecutors to consider race in deciding when to pursue the death
penalty. Prosecutors know that capital sentencers have expansive
discretion. They also recognize that this discretion allows the racial
preconceptions of sentencers to influence sentencer choices. Because
prosecutors often weigh the odds that a sentencer will vote for
death, their perceptions of sentencer biases will tend to influence
their decisions about when to pursue death. 9 Hence, the discretion
87. On the predominance of white jurors among capital sentencing juries, see Bright,
supra note 40, at 454-57. See also Samuel R. Gross & Robert Mauro, Patternsof Death: An
Analysis of Racial Disparitiesin CapitalSentencing and Homicide Victimization, 37 STAN.
L. REV. 27, 108 (1984) (noting that "the great majority ofjurors are white").
88. See Gross & Mauro, supra note 87, at 108-09 (discussing social-science evidence that
individuals empathize more with members of their own race than with members of other
races).
89. See Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:Reckoning with
UnconsciousRacism,39 STAN. L. REV. 317,339 (1987) ("[Tlhere is considerable commonsense
evidence from our everyday experience to confirm that we all harbor prejudiced attitudes
that are kept from our consciousness.").
90. See Gross & Mauro, supra note 87, at 108 ("In a society that remains segregated
socially if not legally, and in which the great majority of jurors are white, jurors are not
likely to identify with black victims or see them as family or friends.").
For a somewhat different but not inconsistent conclusion, see Stephen P. Garvey, The
EmotionalEconomy of CapitalSentencing, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 26, 47 (2000) (concluding from
a study of views of capital-sentencing jurors from South Carolina that black jurors are "more
likely to find defendants likable as people, white and black defendants alike" and, "when the
defendant was black ... also more likely ... to have imagined being in the defendant's
situation and even to have imagined actually being like the defendant").
91. See, e.g., Gross & Mauro, supranote 87, at 109-10 (1984) (asserting that prosecutors
will be motivated in their charging decisions by their predictions of likely jury behavior,
including illegitimate behavior); Gennaro F. Vito & Thomas J. Keil, CapitalSentencing in
Kentucky: An Analysis of the FactorsInfluencing DecisionMaking in the Post-GreggPeriod,
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that promotes the operation of sentencer biases can also influence
prosecutors in earlier phases of capital prosecutions.
In the end, the central characteristics of modern capital selection
approximate those prevailing when the Supreme Court struck down
capital-selection processes in Furman.The death penalty no longer
applies to ordinary crimes that do not involve the taking of human
life, like rape, robbery, and burglary, or even to the least culpable
criminal homicides.9 2 States also now allow both defendants and
prosecutors, at a separate sentencing hearing, to present a
broad array of evidence regarding the defendant's character and
background, which was not true in most death-penalty states
9 3 However, broad application of the
immediately before Furman.
death penalty to murder cases, decentralized decision making,
and expansive discretion regarding prosecutorial and sentencing
decisions continue to characterize the capital-selection process. The
perpetuation of these factors helps explain why racial prejudice can
easily infect the post-Furmanworld of capital sentencing."

II.

STATISTICAL EVIDENCE OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN CAPITAL

SELECTION

Many studies tend to confirm that unexplained racial disparities
have plagued capital-selection systems in the post-Furmanera. The
79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 483, 502 (1988) (positing that prosecutors may conclude that

it is easier to obtain a conviction when the victim is white rather than black).
92. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
93. When Furman was decided, most states did not allow a broad presentation of
mitigating and aggravating evidence beyond that necessary to determine the guilt question.
See generally Scott W. Howe, Reassessing the Individualization Mandate in Capital
Sentencing: Darrow'sDefense ofLeopold and Loeb, 79 IOWA L. REV. 989, 1063 (1994) ("[Tlhe
nature of the capital sentencing inquiry before 1972, while expanding, remained too
unsettled to establish a clear societal consensus about the need to conduct a broad
[sentencing] inquiry.") At that time, most death-penalty states employed unitary hearings
in capital cases, in which the sentencer resolved guilt and sentencing issues together. See id.
at 1062. This approach tended to stifle the presentation of evidence relevant to sentencing
but prejudicial to the guilt determination. See id. at 1062 n.415, 1063 n.420. From the late
1950s through 1972, however, a few states enacted legislation mandating bifurcated hearing
procedures in capital cases, although the rules about what evidence was relevant to
sentencing varied and were generally unsettled. See id. at 1062 n.415, 1062-63.
94. See, e.g., Steiker & Steiker, supra note 10, at 436 (asserting that post-Furman and
pre-Furmancapital sentencing are similar and have "much the same consequences in terms
of arbitrary and discriminatory sentencing patterns").
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studies suggest a strong race-of-victim bias, although they are more
equivocal regarding race-of-defendant bias. Significant variations
exist among death-penalty states regarding the capital statutes
defining death eligibility,9" the number of death sentences imposed
annually," and the number and nature of statistical studies that
have implied racial discrimination.9 7 Nonetheless, the vast majority
of studies have found unexplained race-of-victim disparities and
many also have found unexplained disparities against black
defendants. These studies also have taken place in enough states to
undermine confidence that capital selection is generally free of
racial bias.
A. The Baldus Study in Georgia
The most prominent of the statistical studies focused on Georgia
murder cases from the mid- to late-1970s. A team of researchers led
by Professor David Baldus of the University of Iowa Law School
tried to assess the influence of race and other illegitimate factors
on the selection of murder suspects for death sentences.9 8 The
researchers conducted the study at the behest of abolitionists from
the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, recognizing
that they would likely use it to challenge the Georgia system in the

95. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
96. See generally William S. Lofquist, Putting Them There, Keeping Them There, and
Killing Them: An Analysis of State-Level Variations in Death Penalty Intensity, 87 IOWA L.
REV. 1505 app. B at 1552-56 (2002) (detailing, among other things, new death sentences by

year and by state).
97. For a relatively recent summary regarding states in which researchers have reported

empirical findings regarding race-of-victim or race-of-defendant discrimination in capital
selection, see David C. Baldus et al., Racial Discriminationand the Death Penalty in the
Post-Furman Era: An Empirical and Legal Overview, With Recent Findings from
Philadelphia,83 CORNELL L. REV. 1638 app. B at 1742-45 (1998).

98. See BALDuS ET AL., supranote 12, at 45 ("[Tlhe primary emphasis of the [study] was
on the extent to which racial and other illegitimate or suspect case characteristics influenced
the flow of cases from the point of indictment up to and including the penalty-trial deathsentencing decision.").
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courts.9 9 The study became the basis for the litigation in McCleskey
10 0
v. Kemp.
For all suspects charged with murder in Georgia between 1973
and 1979, the Baldus group found the following death-sentencing
rates in various categories of race-of-defendant and race-of victim
combinations:
Race of Defendant & Victim
1. black defendant/white victim
2. white defendant/white victim
3. black defendant/black victim
4. white defendant/black victim
TOTAL

Death Sentencing Rate
.21 (50/233)
.08 (58/748)
.01 (18/1443)
.03 (2/60)
.05 (128/2484)101

These statistics show that, if the victim was white, the death
sentencing rate was much higher than if the victim was black.
Within the white victim cases, moreover, black defendants received
death sentences at a much higher rate than white defendants.
There was no overall disparity favoring white defendants over
black defendants; on the whole, black defendants received death
sentences less often than white defendants. However, this outcome
stemmed from the predominance of black-on-black murders and the
tiny proportion of death sentences in that category.
These unadjusted outcomes may themselves seem highly suspicious. The intuition that the unadjusted racial disparities stemmed
at least in major part from racial prejudice finds support in the long
history in the United States of widespread racial bias by whites in
favor of whites and against blacks, particularly in the context of the
criminal justice system." 2 Nonetheless, the possibility that legiti99. See id. at 44 ("[We undertook the ... [situdy in 1980 at the request of the NAACP
Legal Defense and Educational Fund Inc. (LDF) with the expectation that the results might
be used to challenge the constitutionality of Georgia's death-sentencing system ....").
100. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
101. See BALDUS ETAL., supra note 12, at 315 tbl.50.
102. See, e.g., McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 332 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting the history of
discrimination and asserting the need to weigh such evidence in determining the plausible
explanations for the racial disparities); DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE (1999) (discussing
evidence of racial discrimination in the modern administration of criminal justice); Kennedy,
supranote 26, at 1411-13 (noting the racist administration of criminal law in the South up
to the present); ef Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2344 (2003) (noting that the country
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mate variables could coincidentally correlate with racial variables
means that the results did not prove that race matters. Therefore,
the Baldus researchers set out to search for any latent, legitimate
variables that could explain the outcomes.
After extensive research and sophisticated analysis, the authors
found no latent factors that could fully or even substantially explain
the racial disparities. To try to find such rationales, the researchers
collected information from the Georgia Board of Pardons and Parole
and the records of the Georgia Supreme Court on approximately
230 variables for each case and each defendant. 103 They then
employed multivariate regression analysis to test the influence of
each of the variables on case outcomes.' 0 ' The researchers determined that no combination ofthe variables could explain the results
without the consideration of race.' 05
The study also confirmed that race strongly influenced case
outcomes. Based on the regression analysis, the researchers
estimated that a defendant was 4.3 times more likely to receive the
death penalty solely because his victim was white rather than
black.'06 As for race-of-defendant discrimination, the researchers
found that black defendants had a modest advantage over white
defendants when all cases were considered.' 7 However, within
the white-victim cases, the researchers found that a defendant was
2.4 times more likely to receive a death sentence simply because
he was black rather than white.' 8 The authors noted that the racial
influences seemed to operate mostly in cases that the authors
viewed in the mid-aggravation range of defendant culpability.'0 9
has struggled with racial inequities and that racial discrimination has not been eliminated).
103. See BALDUS ET AL., supra note 12, at 46.
104. The authors of the study concluded that a 39-variable model that included racial
factors best explained the observed sentencing patterns. See id. at 316. According to the
authors, the 39-variable model was more accurate than the 230-variable model because of
the problem of"redundant variables." This problem arises when the large number of factors
articulated makes it impossible to avoid overlaps of information among them. When several
variables include similar information, their individual influence on outcomes evades accurate
measure. See id. at 457-58.
105. See id. at 316.
106. See id.
107. See id. at 328.
108. See id.
109. Within these supposed mid-range cases, the disparities are significantly larger than
for all cases in the category. See id. at 145 (asserting that, for cases in the extreme ranges,
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The Baldus study tended to show that racial bias skewed the
post-Furman capital selection process in Georgia. Many have
denied that the study actually proved the existence of racial
discrimination. However, the Baldus researchers simply looked for
alternative explanations for the huge and undeniable racial
disparities that history and intuition already suggested were
explained by racial bias." 0 The inability of the researchers to find
an alternative explanation, after substantial investigation and
sophisticated analysis, helps to eliminate the possibility that such
an explanation exists. Perhaps nonracial variables that the study
failed to examine could still explain some of the disparities, but the
arguments are highly conjectural."' The Baldus researchers
certainly offered the most thorough examination of the role of race
in capital selection that has ever been conducted.
B. Other Studies
Many other studies in a variety of death-penalty jurisdictions and
during more recent eras also imply the race-of-victim discrimination
suggested by the Baldus study, although they are more equivocal
regarding race-of-defendant discrimination. Published studies do
not cover all death-penalty states, and the results of a few studies
diverge from the findings of the Baldus researchers. However, the
combined results of other studies give reason to believe that racial
discrimination often infects capital selection.
Based on capital cases during the first decade after Furman,
many researchers conducted studies both in Georgia and in several
other death-penalty states that implied race-of-victim influences.
For example, Bowers and Pierce studied capital sentencing in
homicide cases in Florida, Texas, and Georgia from the late 1970s
decision makers more often reached the same conclusions).
110. On this point, Justice Brennan offered a compelling argument in his McCleskey
dissent that "[elvaluation of McCleskey's evidence cannot rest solely on the numbers
themselves. We must ask whether the conclusion suggested by those numbers is consonant
with our understanding of history and human experience." McCleskeyv. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279,
328 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
111. For a plausible argument regarding a variable that might explain a minor amount
of the race-of-victim disparities but that was not accounted for by the Baldus researchers, see
infra note 184 and accompanying text.
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and found a high risk of powerful white-victim bias in all three
states.'1 2 Likewise, Paternoster and Kazyaka found significant
white-victim bias in the use of the death penalty for homicides
committed between 1977 and 1981 in South Carolina."' Nakell
and Hardy found a strong risk of white-victim prejudice in capital
sentencing for homicides committed between June 1, 1977, and
May 31, 1978, in North Carolina." 4 In each of these studies, the
researchers covered the various stages of decision making in capital
selection by both prosecutors and sentencers. Although not as
thorough as the Baldus study, each of the studies also controlled for
several legitimate case characteristics that could have explained the
racial disparities." 5
112. See William J. Bowers and Glenn L. Pierce, Arbitrarinessand DiscriminationUnder
Post-FurmanCapital Statutes, 26 CRIME & DELINQ. 563, 599 (1980).
113. See Raymond Paternoster & Ann Marie Kazyaka, The Administration of the Death
Penalty in South Carolina:Experiencesover the FirstFew Years, 39 S.C. L. REV. 245,405-06
(1988).
114. See BARRY NAKELL & KENNETH A. HARDY, THE ARBITRARINESS OF THE DEATH
PENALTY 93-161 (1987).
115. See, e.g., id. at xiv (concluding that "the judicial district in which the case was
processed and the race of the defendant" influenced decision making at pretrial stages and
"the race of the victim" influenced outcomes "at the verdict stage"); Bowers & Pierce, supra
note 112, at 629 (noting that the effect of the race-of-victim variable remained important in
explaining outcomes after accounting for several other potentially explanatory factors);
Paternoster & Kazyaka, supranote 113, at 407 ("Substantial instances of both racially based
discrimination and arbitrariness remain.").
A variety of other studies from several states during this same era produced similar
conclusions. See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 56, at 1327-30 (finding unexplained, race-of-victim
disparities in the Baldus data set from Georgia after using a grouping system for classifying
similar cases based on crime and offender characteristics); Sheldon Ekland-Olsen, Structured
Discretion,RacialBias, and the Death Penalty:The FirstDecade After Furman in Texas, 69
SOC. SCI. Q. 853 (1988) (finding unexplained, race-of-victim disparities in capital cases
from Texas in first decade after Furman-induced reforms); Michael L. Radelet, Racial
Characteristicsand the Imposition ofthe DeathPenalty,46 AM. SOC. REV. 918 (1981) (finding,
among 637 homicide indictments in twenty Florida counties during 1976 and 1977, that those
who killed whites were substantially more likely to receive a death sentence after controlling
for several nonracial factors that might be thought to explain the racial differences); Michael
L. Radelet & Glenn L. Pierce, Race and ProsecutorialDiscretion in Homicide Cases, 19 LAW
& SOC'Y REV. 587, 612 (1985) (finding that among Florida homicide cases from a random
sample of twenty-one counties, prosecutors were most likely to pursue the death penalty in
cases in which the victim was white); M. Dwayne Smith, Patterns of Discriminationin
Assessments of the Death Penalty: The Case of Louisiana,15 J. CRIM. JUST. 279, 285 (1987)
(finding unexplained, race-of-victim disparities in 504 death-eligible cases from 1977 to 1982
in Louisiana); Zeisel, supra note 62, at 459-61 (finding, for post-Furman Florida cases
through 1977, that those who murdered whites were much more likely to be sentenced to
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Another study that was noteworthy for covering a broad range of
jurisdictions also found race-of-victim biases."' Professors Samuel
Gross and Robert Mauro looked at all homicides reported to the FBI
from January 1, 1976, through December 31, 1980, in eight states:
Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Mississippi, North Carolina,
Oklahoma, and Virginia. 117 Initially, they found race-of-victim
disparities in capital sentencing in all eight jurisdictions."' They
also looked for nonracial variables that might explain the differences. Their information came from standardized police reports,
known as Supplementary Homicide Reports, that are filed with the
Uniform Crime Reporting section of the FBI,"9 along with data
gathered by the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund
through its ongoing census of death-row inmates. 2 ' From these
sources, the researchers were able to gather data about each case
on several variables, including the race and sex of the victim(s) and
killer, the relationship between the victim(s) and killer, the number
of victims, the location of the homicide, the criminal record of the
killer, the weapon employed in the killing, and whether the killing
was committed during a felony.' 2 ' The researchers also "classified
the homicides by the number of major legitimate aggravating
factors reported for each case"'2 2 and "examined the racial patterns
3
in capital sentencing separately at each level of aggravation."
In addition, they conducted a series of regression analyses to test
for racial effects while controlling for the effects of various combinations of nonracial variables. 124 Although the study was not as well
controlled as the Baldus Study, the researchers identified "a

death than those who murdered blacks and that the large differences remained for cases in

which the murder was committed during another felony).
116. See generally Gross & Mauro, supra note 87.
117. See id. at 49.
118. See id. at 56 tbl.2 (detailing the death-sentencing rates by racial category in Georgia,

Florida and Illinois); id. at 94 tbl.30 (providing the rates by racial category in Oklahoma,
North Carolina, Mississippi, Virginia, and Arkansas).
119. See id. at 49.
120. See id. at 50.

121. See id. at 51-52.
122. Id. at 69.
123. Id.
124. See id.
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remarkably stable and consistent" pattern of racial discrimination
in the imposition of the death penalty in all eight states. 2 '
In a well-controlled study of capital sentencing in Kentucky that
included cases decided well into the 1980s, Vito and Keil also found
unexplained racial disparities. 126 They examined all cases between
December 22, 1976, and October 1, 1986, in which a grand jury
issued an indictment for murder.'2 7 Initially, they found that those
who killed whites were much more likely to be sentenced to death
than those who killed blacks. 12 After conducting a regression
analysis that controlled for a variety of factors concerning the
aggravation level of the crime and the prior criminal history of the
defendant, they concluded that Kentucky prosecutors had been
influenced by racial factors. They identified no racial effects in the
final sentencing decisions of juries. 1 29 However, the decisions of
prosecutors about when to pursue the death penalty were heavily
influenced by both the race of the victim and the race of the
defendant. 3 0 Racial discrimination by prosecutors also significantly
affected the overall distribution of death sentences.' 3 '
A complex and well-controlled study of prosecutorial discretion
conducted in New Jersey also found pronounced race-of-victim and
race-of-defendant disparities that could not find explanation in
nonracial variables.'3 2 This study, by Bienen and others, focused on
703 cases in which a formal charge for a homicide offense was
lodged during the three years after the effective date of the
125. See id. at 105.
126. See Vito & Keil, supra note 91, at 503 (concluding that the Kentucky capitalsentencing system had produced the same racially discriminatory outcome as revealed in
many studies in other death-penalty states).
127. See id. at 494-95.
128. See id. at 499 tbl.3.
129. See id. at 501 ("Rather than reacting to the combination of the race of the victim and
the race of the accused in imposing sentence, Kentucky juries may react to the objective
heinousness of the murder cases brought before them.").
130. See id. at 502 ("T]he pattern of effects demonstrated by the race of the victim-race
of the offender combination indicates that, controlling for differences in the objective
heinousness of the ofense, prosecutors are more likely to seek the death penalty when a black
kills a white than in other homicide cases.").
131. See id. at 503 (concluding that the racial discrimination in the decisions by
prosecutors is "not eliminated" in the latter stages of the capital selection process").
132. See Leigh B. Bienen et al., The Reimposition of CapitalPunishment in New Jersey:
The Role of ProsecutorialDiscretion,41 RUTGERs L. REv. 27 (1988).
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reenactment of capital punishment in New Jersey in 1982.133 The
researchers gathered data on over one hundred potentially relevant
variables concerning the offender and the circumstances of the
crime. 134 They found pronounced discrepancies in the treatment of
cases by prosecutors based on both the race of the victim and the
race of the defendant. 13 Even after a regression analysis controlling
for other variables, the researchers found that "the odds that a
homicide involving a white victim would go to trial were nearly
three times greater than for the Hispanic comparison category and
more than five times greater than for the black comparison category." 136 Among the trial cases and after controlling for nonracial
factors, the odds were also much greater that a prosecutor would
pursue the death penalty in white-victim cases than in black-victim
cases, and greatest of all among the37white-victim cases in which the
defendant was Hispanic or black. 1
Not all studies of capital selection have identified race-of-victim
discrimination. For example, Arkin studied 350 cases from Dade
County, Florida, in which a grand jury issued an indictment for
first-degree murder between 1973 and 1976.138 He found initial
disparities in death-sentencing rates that correlated with both the
race of the victim and the race of the defendant.1 3 9 He concluded,
however, that the differences arose from the more aggravated
nature of cases involving white victims 40 and that, once the focus
133. See id. at 36-37.
134. See id. at 327.
135. See id.

136. Id. at 230 (footnote omitted).
137. The researchers noted that white defendant/Hispanic victim cases presented the
greatest odds that the prosecutor would pursue the death penalty but also noted that the
number of such cases (four death-penalty prosecutions out of five trials) was "too small ... to
establish a meaningful pattern." See id. at 240 n.710. Among the other cases, the
probabilities were "Hispanic/white,.31; black/white,.31; black/Hispanic,.22; black/black,.15;
white/white, .13; Hispanic/black, .08; Hispanic/Hispanic, .04; and white/black, .03." See id.
at 240.
138. See Steven D. Arkin, Note, DiscriminationandArbitrarinessin CapitalPunishment:
An Analysis of Post-FurmanMurder Cases in Dade County, Florida,1973-1976,33 STAN. L.
REV. 75, 86 (1980).
139. See id. at 87 tbl.2 (revealing that, while only 1% of the black-on-black murders and
0% of the white-on-black murders resulted in a death sentence, 3% of the white-on-white and
7% of the black-on-white murders resulted in the capital sanction).
140. See id. at 100-01 ("The significantly greater proportion of felony murders in
interracial killings and the predominance of white victims in these killings explains apparent
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was on only felony-murder cases, the disparities correlating with
race became insignificant.1 4 ' Although some differences existed in
death sentences correlating with race within the felony-murder
cases,142 Arkin determined that they were statistically insignificant
143
in light of the small number of actual death sentences imposed.
Thus, he found that the data revealed no conclusive evidence of
racial discrimination. 144
A study from California also found no evidence of racial discrimination in capital sentencing. Klein and Rolph studied homicides
committed in California after August 10, 1977, for which the
offender had been sentenced to death or was under a sentence of life
imprisonment without parole as of March 1, 1984.145 They found
that death sentences resulted more frequently in white-victim
murders than in non-white-victim murders. 1 46 Using a complex
system for classifying cases, however, they found that the apparent
racial disparities were actually explained by the interaction of
legitimate, nonracial variables. 4 7
While many of the studies implying racial bias are imperfect,
both the Arkin study from Miami and the Klein and Rolph study
from California had particularly serious limitations. Arkin looked
only at cases that a prosecutor had already decided warranted
indictment for first-degree murder, and his sample included only
disparities in capital sentencing.").
141. See id. at 88-89, 89 tbl.4 ("Table 4 demonstrates that if the 350 cases are separated
into the categories of felony murders and nonfelony murders, outcomes for the four offendervictim categories are quite similar.") (footnote omitted).
142. For the cases in which the killing occurred during a separate felony and in which the
defendant was found guilty of first-degree murder, the sentencing rates for the various racial
categories was: black-on-black, 17% (1/6); white-on-black, 0% (0/0); white-on-white, 16%
(4/25); and black-on-white, 19% (5/26). See id. at 89, tbl.4.
143. See id. at 90 ("[T]he sample size becomes too small to infer racial discrimination even
though cases with black defendants and white victims resulted in death sentences slightly
more often than other felony murder cases.").
144. See id. at 100 (asserting that the data "reveals no conclusive evidence of racial
discrimination when the difference between felony murders and nonfelony murders is taken
into account").
145. See Stephen P. Klein & John E. Rolph, Relationship of Offender and Victim Race to
Death Penalty Sentences in California, 32 JURIMETRICs J. 33, 37 (1991).
146. See id. at 37-38. Klein and Rolph do not subdivide the nonwhite category into black
persons and other nonwhite persons.
147. See id. at 42 (noting that "the death sentencing rate for white victim cases did not
differ in a statistically significant way from the rate for nonwhite victim cases").
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ten death sentences,148 which was too small to provide definitive
conclusions.149 Klein and Rolph studied a larger sample of cases but,
like Arkin, only at the final stage of decision making by a capital
sentencer."50 The narrow focus of both studies excluded important
segments of the overall capital selection process and created a
significant potential for "sample selection bias."15 ' This problem
arises when the sample of cases has itself resulted from biased
decision making that may obscure or influence the patterns of
decision making observed at the stage under study.'52 Hence, these
studies were not very helpful in deciding whether racial bias
influenced the overall capital-selection process or even the late
stages actually examined.' 53
In 1990, moreover, an evaluative synthesis by the federal General
Accounting Office (GAO) of all then-existing post-Furman studies
concluded that race influenced the charging and sentencing

148. See Arkin, supra note 138, at 86 (noting that the study "analyzes 350 murder cases
presented to the grand jury in Dade County, Florida, for a first-degree murder indictment"
and that only ten cases from the sample resulted in a death sentence that was not reduced
to life imprisonment).
149. See, e.g., Gross & Mauro, supra note 87, at 43 (concluding that "the small size of his
sample-ten death penalties in all-precludes a definite conclusion on the existence of racial
discrimination") (footnote omitted).
150. See Klein & Rolph, supranote 145, at 44 ("We did not examine possible bias at earlier
stages such as police investigation and arrest practices, prosecutor charging decisions, case
preparation, jury verdicts regarding guilt or innocence, and prosecutor requests for the death

penalty.").
151. See Gross & Mauro, supra note 87, at 46.
152. Gross and Mauro aptly describe the concern:
Sample selection bias can have various effects. It can create a false appearance
of discrimination, or it can change the apparent magnitude of a real
discriminatory practice, but the most likely effect in this context is the one
illustrated: Discrimination of a particular type at an early stage of the criminal
justice process may conceal, or partially conceal, discrimination of the same
type at a later stage.
Id. at 47 (footnote omitted).
153. A pre-Furmanstudy from California also found no racial discrimination at the last
stage of decision making by the capital sentencer. In 1969, the Stanford Law Review, as a
special project, studied 238 cases from 1958 through 1966 in which juries had decided
whether to sentence to death persons convicted of first-degree murder. See A Study of the
CaliforniaPenaltyJury in First-Degree-MurderCases, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1297 (1969). After
analyzing many variables, the researchers found no race-of-defendant or race-of-victim
discrimination. See id. at 1368-76. Because of the narrow focus on the final sentencing
decision, this study also suffers from the same limitations as the Klein and Rolph study.
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decisions in death-penalty cases."8 ' In reaching this conclusion, the
GAO experts initially identified fifty-three studies that were
relevant. 55 From this group, twenty-five were excluded because
they were deemed of poor quality or involved duplicative research
published by the same authors in another study.' The GAO
experts then rated the remaining twenty-eight studies according to
research quality and statistical competence. 157 After reviewing the
various studies, the experts concluded that they demonstrated that
racial factors generally influenced capital selection. They noted that
"in 82 percent of the studies, race of victim was found to influence8
the likelihood" that a murderer would receive a death sentence.15
They also noted that "[tihis finding was remarkably consistent
across data sets, states, data collection methods, and analytic
techniques" and that it "held for high, medium, and low quality
studies." 1"9 The experts also noted that many of the studies found
a race-of-defendant influence, although this factor was not as "clear
cut" and that it "varie[d] across a number of dimensions." 60
Subsequent studies also tend to confirm the GAO conclusions.
Professor Baldus,joined by others, has published results from more
recent studies outside of Georgia that reach the same basic
conclusions as the original Georgia study. For example, in 1992,
Professor Baldus was appointed Special Master for the New Jersey
Supreme Court in the conduct of an ongoing review of capital
sentencing in New Jersey.' The study covered all death-eligible
defendants, regardless of how their cases were charged. 62 In 1997,
Professor Baldus concluded that the New Jersey system in the
period from 1989 showed some unexplained, race-of-victim disparity
in prosecutorial decision making, although less than that identified
154. See GAO, DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING: RESEARCH INDICATES PATTERN OF RACIAL
DISPARITIES (1990) [hereinafter GAO STUDY].

155. See id. at 2.
156. See id.
157. See id.

158. Id. at 5.
159. Id.

160. Id. at 6.
161. See State v. Marshall, 613 A.2d 1059, 1063 (N.J. 1992) (noting the order appointing
Professor Baldus).
162. See Baldus et al., supra note 97, at 1667.
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in the original Georgia study.'6 3 He also found that the New Jersey
system revealed strong, unexplained, race-of-defendant discrimination by sentencing juries against black defendants, much
stronger than the comparative level of discrimination against
blacks revealed in the Georgia study.'6 4
Another recent study led by Professor Baldus also found significant race-of-victim and race-of-defendant discrimination in capital
cases from Philadelphia.' 6 5 This study covered all phases of the
capital selection process for a large proportion of all death-eligible
defendants prosecuted from 1983 through 1993.166 The researchers
gathered information about each of the resulting 524 cases from a
variety of sources, including jury verdict sheets, appellate records,
trial records and even newspaper accounts. 6 v Upon analyzing the
data in several ways, including regression analysis, the researchers found substantial disparities against killers of nonblack
victims16 8 and even stronger race-of-defendant bias against black
defendants.16 9 The researchers noted that the Philadelphia results
differed from those reached in their earlier Georgia project in that
the primary source of the racial disparities in Philadelphia was the
jury rather than the prosecutor. 170 Nonetheless, the disparate
outcomes of the cases were also egregious.
Numerous other recent studies also have implied that race
influences capital selection. A complex and well-controlled study of
capital selection in Maryland between 1978 and 1999, commissioned in 2000 by then-Governor Parris Glendening, 171 found
pronounced bias against killers of white victims and, within the
163. See id. at 1662-64 & n.79.
164. See id. at 1664. Professor Baldus concluded that some race-of-defendant
discrimination in Georgia may have been "obscured because of the less-detailed data that
were available" from Georgia. Id. at 1665.
165. See id. at 1675-1710.
166. See id. at 1667, 1669.
167. See id. at 1671.
168. See id. at 1714-15.
169. See id. at 1713-14.
170. See id. at 1715.
171. See RAYMONDPASTERNOSTERETAL.,AN EMPIRICALANALYSISOFMARYLAND'S DEATH
SENTENCING SYSTEM WITH RESPECT TO THE INFLUENCE OF RACE AND LEGAL JURISDICTION

(2003), availableathttp://www.urhome.umd.edu/newsdesk/pdf/'fmalrep.pdf (last visited Apr.
8, 2004).
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white-victim cases, additional bias against black offenders. 7 2 A
less-well-controlled study of cases ending in first-degree murder
convictions in Illinois between 1988 and 199717" also concluded that
those who killed white victims were much more likely to receive a
death sentence than were killers of black victims. 174 Although this

Illinois study focused on only the sentencing stage and controlled
for a relatively small number of variables, the findings at least raise
questions about the racial neutrality of the Illinois selection
process. 7 5 Likewise, an in-depth and well-controlled study of race
and the death penalty in North Carolina, focusing on 502 homicides
that occurred from 1993 to 1997,176 concluded that defendants

whose victims were white were 3.5 times more likely to be sentenced to death than defendants whose victims were nonwhite.'77

172. The study found:
[G]iven that a homicide is death eligible, blacks who kill whites are two and
one-half times more likely to be sentenced to death than are whites who kill
whites (.043 vs. .017), three and one-half times more likely than are blacks who
kill blacks (.043 vs. .012), and almost eleven times more likely to be sentenced
to death than "other" racial combinations (.043 vs. .004).
Id. at 36.
173. See Glenn L. Pierce & Michael L. Radelet, Race, Region, and Death Sentencing in
Illinois, 1988-1997, 81 OR. L. REV. 39 (2002).
174. See id. at 62-63 ("Specifically, 3.8% of the first-degree murder cases where the
[murder] victim(s) was white resulted in a death sentence, versus 1.1% of the cases where
the murder victim(s) was black, and 1.5% of the cases where the victim(s) was Hispanic.")
(footnote omitted).
175. The authors of the study note:
Critics of this study who point to its limited scope and limited number of
variables should realize that the addition of more data could very well increase
the power of non-legal explanatory variables. Baldus et al., for example, point
to nine states where both well-controlled and less-well-controlled studies of
death sentencing have been conducted. In two-thirds of these states, the racial
disparities were strongerin the well-controlled studies than in the less complex
work.
Id. at 66-67 (footnote omitted).
176. See Isaac Unah & Jack Boger, Race and the Death Penalty in North Carolina:An
EmpiricalAnalysis: 1993-1997, (2001), at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.orglarticle.php?scid
=19&did=246 (last visited Apr. 8, 2004).
177. See id.
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C. A Summary View
From a national perspective, the available research implies that
racial bias, particularly race-of-victim bias, influences capital
selection on a widespread basis.178 There are sufficient studies from
a sufficient number of states finding unexplained race-of-victim
disparities to undermine confidence in the neutrality of capital
selection nationally. The relatively small number of studies that
have failed to imply race-of-victim bias also have focused on narrow
segments of ajurisdiction's capital selection process and, thus,
have
179
system.
larger
the
affected
bias
whether
failed to measure
The studies also provide evidence that race-of-defendant bias in
capital selection is still prevalent, though not as consistent across
all jurisdictions or even throughout single jurisdictions and not as
strong in the South as in the pre-Furmanera.' More than half of
the studies have found an unexplained race-of-defendant influence
on outcomes.' However, in about one-fourth of that group, white
defendants rather than black defendants were disfavored, at least
on a state-wide basis.' 8 2 Nonetheless, several studies that have
found no bias against black defendants on a system-wide basis have
identified such bias in discrete contexts, such as in white-victim
cases. 183 Likewise, a significant number of studies remain in which
researchers have found generalized bias against black defendants.
Thus, the studies do reveal grounds for concern about race-ofdefendant bias even if those grounds are not as clear as with raceof-victim bias.
178. The findings of the GAO in its 1990 study support this conclusion. See GAO STUDY,
supra note 154, at 5 ("Our synthesis of the 28 studies shows a pattern of evidence indicating
racial disparities in the charging, sentencing, and imposition of the death penalty....").
179. See supra text accompanying notes 148-53.
180. See, e.g., Baldus et al., supra note 6, at 158-61 (noting that "by and large, the evidence
of race-of-defendant discrimination, particularly the most recent evidence, is neither strong
nor consistent" and that there was a "strong and systematic bias against black defendants
[in the] ... pre-Furmansentencing patterns in the South") (footnotes omitted).
181. See GAO STUDY, supra note 154, at 6 (stating that "more than half of the studies
found that race of defendant influenced the likelihood of being charged with a capital crime
or receiving the death penalty") (footnote omitted).
182. See id. (noting that of the studies that found a race-of-defendant effect, almost onefourth found that "white defendants were more likely to be sentenced to death").
183. See, e.g., BALDUS ETAL., supra note 12, at 328.
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Are the studies implying racial bias flawed? Even the most
complex of the studies do not control for every conceivably relevant
variable. For example, commentators have suggested that lesser
support within the black community for capital punishment could
account for reduced pressure on prosecutors and jurors to seek and
impose the death sentence in black-victim cases. 84 The postFurman studies have not examined whether the disparities are
partially explained on this basis. However, the bias against black
defendants who kill whites revealed in several studies indicates
that this theory could not explain all of the racial disparities or even
all of the race-of-victim differences. More importantly, retentionists
have failed to offer good evidence that this or any other omitted
variable actually explains the racial disparities. A conclusion that
omitted-variable problems undermine the studies should itself
require significant support.
In the end, the sociological studies provide valuable evidence that
racial bias influences capital selection. As Justice Brennan noted in
his dissenting opinion in McCleskey, the studies should be considered in conjunction with the historical and contemporary evidence
of racial prejudice in the United States.'8 5 Fair assessment of the
question requires recognizing "our Nation's struggle with racial
inequality"'1 6 and that "race unfortunately still matters."' The
studies also should be considered with an understanding of the
limited protections against racial discrimination that appear in
184. See, e.g., Zeisel, supra note 62, at 467. The argument may be particularly relevant
to the prosecutorial decision:
If, as Justice Blackmun's dissent indicates, district attorneys are not seeking
the death penalty in black-victim cases, it may be in part because there is not

enough public pressure to do so. How can there be, when the leaders of the
black community are dedicated heart and soul to the total abolition of capital
punishment? How can any leader denounce capital punishment as barbaric one
day and pound on the prosecutor's desk the next, demanding that very
punishment for the white killer of a black victim? He cannot, without looking
like a complete hypocrite. The result is a tragic loss of advocacy for the black
victim.
Kent S. Scheidegger, CapitalPunishment in 1987: The Puzzle Nears Completion, 15 W. ST.
U. L. R&V. 95, 125-26 (1987).
185. See supra note 110.
186. Grutterv. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003) (upholding affirmative action program for
admission of students at University of Michigan School of Law).
187. Id. at 335.
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post-Furmancapital-punishment systems."'8 The relevant question
is not whether the studies definitively prove racial discrimination
when considered in a vacuum but whether they provide additional
evidence of what our existing knowledge already implies about
capital selection.
The studies, considered as a group, imply racial discrimination.
They demonstrate major disparities along racial lines in unadjusted, capital sentencing rates and then rule out possible innocent
explanations for those disparities. As noted, the studies vary
regarding quality and thoroughness, and, in some states, no studies
have been reported.'8 9 Likewise, results of past studies will not
replicate across all periods in precisely the same way. Nonetheless,
the disparities are too pronounced and too consistent across studies,
states, and time to ignore.' 90
Even some staunch proponents of capital punishment have
conceded the prevalence of race-bias in capital selection.191 Justice
Scalia is a notable example. In a private memorandum to the other
Justices in 1987, later exposed when the late Justice Marshall's
papers were made public, Justice Scalia acknowledged the influence
of racial bias.'9 2 The memorandum was written as the Court
considered whether the evidence from the Baldus Study made out
188. See supra Part I.
189. Differences also exist among death-penalty states regarding the demographics of the
citizenry, the history of race relations, and the use of the capital sanction, which likely affects
the level of racial discrimination in capital selection. See, e.g., Gross & Mauro, supranote 87,
at 48 (noting that "racial factors may have different effects on capital sentencing at different
times and in different places"); see also Lofquist, supra note 96, at 1510 ("[H]istorical
practices of executions ... and underlying patterns of social relations rooted in slavery, are
at least as important as contemporary measures of social conditions in shaping death penalty
intensity.").
190. Some commentators urge, however, that the studies implying racial bias provide no
basis for concern because they do not adequately prove discrimination. See Rothman &
Powers, supra note 21, at 3; see also Dolinko, supra note 26, at 581 (asserting that "[tihere
is reason to doubt not only the strength of the statisitical evidence but also [because of the
omitted variable problem] the cogency of the inferences drawn from it").
191. See, e.g., John C. McAdams, Racial Disparity and the Death Penalty, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1998, at 153, 166 ("There is a general and quite robust bias
against black victims ....").

192. See, e.g., Dennis D. Dorin, Far Right of the Mainstream: Racism, Rights, and
Remedies From the Perspective of Justice Antonin Scalia's McCleskey Memorandum, 45
MERCER L. REV. 1035, 1037-38 (1994) (discussing the disclosure of Justice Scalia's
memorandum when the Library of Congress made public the papers of Justice Marshall).
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a constitutional violation in McCleskey.1 93 Justice Scalia wrote:
"Since it is my view that the unconscious operation of irrational
sympathies and antipathies, including racial, upon jury decisions
and (hence) prosecutorial decisions is real, acknowledged in the
decisions of this Court, and ineradicable, I cannot honestly say that
all I need is more proof." 94 Justice Scalia's statement underscores
that there is nothing radical in accepting the statistical studies
as grounds to doubt that capital selection is race neutral. To the
contrary, the studies support the view that racial prejudice
frequently influences who dies.

III. ALTERNATIVE REGULATORY APPROACHES AND THE FATED
FAILURE OF SUPREME COURT EFFORTS To SECURE RACIAL
NEUTRALITY IN CAPITAL SELECTION

Given the evidence that existing doctrine has failed to achieve
racial neutrality in capital selection, this Part asks whether the
Supreme Court could have achieved neutrality through alternative
regulatory approaches. The alternatives that have been suggested
all fall into one of four categories: (a) imposing "super due process"
requirements on the imposition of capital sentences; (b) forcing the
reintroduction of mandatory death sentencing for aggravated
murder; (c) forcing a narrowing of death eligibility to a small
category of the very worst murders; and (d) reversing all death
sentences in contexts in which statistical evidence reveals a
reasonable likelihood that racial bias influenced the outcomes. This
Part demonstrates why none of these alternative approaches
provide true solutions, except to the extent that they thwart the use
of capital punishment, thereby further undermining the moral case
for the penalty, and mire federal courts in continual death-penalty
challenges. In sum, this Part concludes that racial bias in capital
selection is ineradicable, as a practical matter, through federal
regulation.
193. See HenryJ. Reske, Behind The Scenes, 79 A.B.A. J. 28 (1993) (quotingMemorandum
to the Conference from JusticeAntonin Scalia in No. 84-6811-McCleskey v. Kemp, Jan. 6,
1987, in McCleskey v. Kemp File, THURGOOD MARSHALL PAPERS, The Library of Congress,
Washington, D.C.).
194. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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A. "SuperDue Process"Regulation
Imposing "super due process" protections on the use of capital
punishment is not a plausible approach for achieving racial
neutrality. Procedural reforms could impede the use of the death
penalty in general, which would reduce the number of persons
subject to racially biased death sentences. However, actually
eliminating racial bias by this approach would likely produce
something close to abolition.
Some commentators have noted that procedural reforms could
help ensure equal outcomes for equally situated defendants.'9 5
Suggestions have focused, for example, on doing more to ensure the
fairness of capital juries,'9 on improving the minimum quality of
legal representation provided to capital defendants 9 7 and on
expanding the possibility for merits review in state and federal
habeas proceedings.' 8 These kinds of reforms surely would help
ensure the legitimacy of all capital sentences and would also
safeguard against certain kinds of inequality. However, they would
not directly reduce the influence of racial prejudice.
Procedural reforms like those suggested could deter the use of the
death penalty in general and, therefore, reduce the overall number
of persons subject to racially biased death sentences. For example,
assume that the Supreme Court decided that no potential jurors
would be disqualified from resolving the guilt issue in a capital case
simply because they could not also vote for a capital sentence.
Under the Sixth Amendment, states presently may select a single
195. See, e.g., Steiker & Steiker, supra note 10, at 421-25 ("A more encompassing
'heightened reliability' requirement would insist on affirmative (or 'proactive') efforts on the
part of states to ensure that similarly-situated defendants have roughly equal chances of
prevailing at trial and vindicating their constitutional rights.").
196. See, e.g., Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 203-04 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(contending that the Constitution should be understood to require the use of separate juries
at the guilt and sentencing phases of capital cases).
197. See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 10, at 421-23; see also Celestine Richards
McConville, The Right to Effective Assistance of Capital Postconviction Counsel:
ConstitutionalImplications ofStatutory Grantsof Capital Counsel, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 31, 36
(arguing that "the government's decision to provide capital postconviction counsel triggers
a constitutional obligation to provide effective assistance of counsel") (footnote omitted).
198. See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 10, at 423-25.
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capital jury to resolve both the guilt-or-innocence and sentencing
questions'9 9 and may disqualify all potential jurors whose views on
the death penalty "would prevent or substantially impair" their
ability to consider imposing the death penalty at sentencing.0 0 By
eliminating this ground for disqualification, the Supreme Court
could effectively require separate juries for the guilt-or-innocence
and sentencing trials. This "super due process" rule would make
pursuing a death sentence slightly more costly than under current
doctrine and, therefore, probably would deter prosecutors in a few
cases from pursuing capital punishment.
The difficulty with such procedural protections, however, is
that they generally are not closely related to reduced racial
discrimination. Conviction-prone juries, poor counsel, and restrictive habeas review, for example, would not necessarily prejudice
capital defendants more often in black-victim cases than in whitevictim cases. Consequently, protections aimed at addressing those
problems, while making the death penalty more difficult to obtain
in a certain run of cases, could not be expected to reduce racial
prejudice directly. Imposition of such protections might reduce the
proportion of death sentences as much in black-victim cases as in
white-victim cases, with no net reduction in the sentencing-rate
disparity between the two categories. On that assumption, any
reduction in racially biased capital sentences would arise only as
the random consequence of a larger reduction in the overall number
of death sentences.0 1

199. In Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 165, the Court concluded that:

The Constitution [does not] prohibit the removal for cause, prior to the guilt
phase of a bifurcated capital trial, of prospective jurors whose opposition to the

death penalty is so strong that it would prevent or substantially impair the
performance of their duties as jurors at the sentencing phase of the trial.
200. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted)

(footnote omitted).
201. Any theory that such protections could more greatly deter pursuit of death sentences
in racial categories in which the death penalty is less utilized would involve unwarranted
assumptions that the protections would have a direct correlation to reduced race bias. One
might posit, for example, that all severe procedural burdens would make prosecutors avoid
pursuing the death penalty except in the most egregious cases, which might also be the cases
where racial bias would not matter. Unless the protections confronted racial discrimination
directly, however, they would not prevent racial bias from influencing perceptions about

which murders clearly warranted the death penalty.
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Using indirect protections that would reduce the use of the death
penalty to near abolition levels would also create as much trouble
as it would solve. One of the principal complaints about capital
punishment in practice has been that its sparse usage undermines
20 3
2 2 that support it.
the retribution and deterrence arguments

Because states impose the death penalty on murderers rarely and
rather arbitrarily, it does not seem likely to deter murders. °4
Likewise, the penalty cannot find support in retributive theory if
almost nobody from the group thought to warrant execution
receives the sanction.0 5 Yet, thwarting the use of the death penalty
to near abolition levels only further undermines the moral argument for the death penalty. °6
Identifying procedural safeguards to confront racial bias directly
also has met with little success. Some safeguards against juror bias
have been tried, such as requiring jurors to certify that race has not
202. See Susan Bandes, Empathy, Narrative, and Victim Impact Statements, 63 U. CHI.
L. REV. 361, 397 (1996) ('The usual justifications advanced for the death penalty are
retribution and deterrence.") (footnote omitted).
203. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 313 (1972) (White, J., concurring) ("I
cannot avoid the conclusion that as the statutes before us are now administered, the penalty
is so infrequently imposed that the threat of execution is too attenuated to be of substantial
service to criminal justice."); Jack Greenberg, Against the American System of Capital
Punishment,99 HARV. L. REV. 1670,1675-78 (1986) (contending that the infrequent, random,
and erratic nature ofexecutions undermines the arguments for capital punishment based on
deterrence and retribution); Alex Kozinski & Sean Gallagher, Death: The Ultimate Run-On
Sentence, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 4 (1995) ("Whatever purposes the death penalty is said
to serve-deterrence, retribution, assuaging the pain suffered by victims' families-these
purposes are not served by the system as it now operates."); McAdams, supranote 27, at 836
(lamenting that "many jurisdictions that have the death penalty on the books rarely or never
execute anybody" although '[miost sensible models of human behavior suggest that people
will not be much influenced by a punishment that is not actually imposed").
204. See, e.g., Furman,408 U.S. at 312 (White, J., concurring) ("Most important, a major
goal of the criminal law-to deter others by punishing the convicted criminal-would not be
substantially served where the penalty is so seldom invoked that it ceases to be the credible
threat essential to influence the conduct of others."). Regarding whether the death penalty
deters murders, see also infra note 351.
205. See, e.g., Lempert, supra note 38, at 1182 ("If inconsistent sentencing prevents the
derivation of a socially validated principle, the person who applauds the execution of the
murderer is applauding what is literally unprincipled state action.").
206. This conclusion applies obviously in aggressive death-penalty states, but also in those
states that currently only rarely apply the sanction. In those less-aggressive states,
retentionists can argue, though not forcefully, the possibility of increased use of the sanction.
These arguments lose all force in the face of a deliberate strategy that is expected to
minimize the use of the death penalty.
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influenced their sentencing verdict. °7 Given the unconscious nature
of much racial bias," 8 however, and the tendency of those with
conscious bias to camouflage it, this remedy seems ineffectual even
regarding juries, 09 and it does not directly address racial bias by
prosecutors.1 0 The Supreme Court has also long made efforts in all
criminal cases to ensure that members of minority groups are not
" ' and
purposefully excluded on racial grounds from jury pools21
212
actual juries.
These strategies also have failed, however, to
eliminate racial bias in capital selection.1 3 In the end, procedural
protections appear unlikely to ensure racial neutrality except to the
extent that they thwart the use of capital punishment.
B. Mandatory Death Sentencing
The imposition of mandatory death sentences on all offenders
found guilty of capital crimes also would not work. The Supreme
207. The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 imposed such a requirement in federal court in
cases in which the prosecution seeks the death penalty in drug-related killings.
The jury shall return to the court a certificate signed by each juror that
consideration of the race, color, religious beliefs, national origin, or sex of the
defendant or the victim was not involved in reaching his or her individual
decision, and that the individual juror would have made the same
recommendation regarding a sentence for the crime in question no matter what
the race, color, religious beliefs, national origin, or sex of the defendant, or the
victim, may be.
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, 21 U.S.C. § 848(oXl) (2002).
208. Regarding the unconscious nature of much racial bias, see generally Lawrence, supra
note 89, at 317 (describing the author's particular experience of being the only black child in
his private elementary school reading group).
209. See, e.g., Bright, supranote 40, at 464-65 (asserting that the protection will do little
to prevent discrimination even by jurors, because many will be unaware of their own racial
prejudice, and of those who are, few will allow the certification to stop them from
discriminating).
210. See id. at 464 ("By the time the jury is selected, racial prejudice may have already
influenced the prosecutor's decisions to seek the death penalty, to refuse a plea bargain for
a non-capital sentence, and to strike minority jurors.").
211. See, e.g., Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370, 396-97 (1881) (concluding that the absence
for ten years of even one African American on the jury rolls in a county with a fifteen percent
African American population provided primafacie evidence of intentional discrimination);
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 309-11 (1880) (striking down on equal protection
grounds a state statute that explicitly barred African Americans from jury service).
212. See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85-88 (1986); Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S.
28, 36-38 (1986).
213. See supra note 13 (discussing Batson and Turner decisions).
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Court declared such an approach unconstitutional long ago. 2 1'
Commentators have asked whether the Court should rescind this
prohibition to spur more capital sentences in black-victim cases.2 15
The Court rejected mandatory death penalties, however, in
part because they would not solve the potential for arbitrary or
discriminatory outcomes.2 1 The mandatory system would control
results only at the final sentencing stage. Racially discriminatory
reprieves by prosecutors and juries could still occur at earlier
stages2 1 7 and might even grow given the decision maker's knowledge that reprieves could not occur at sentencing.2 18 The results
under a mandatory system would, therefore, likely remain highly
discriminatory.2 9 This argument may have provided little reason
for the Court to ban mandatory death penalties in favor of discretionary capital sentencing.2 2 ° The rationale does explain, however,
why mandatory death penalties would not likely produce the
214. See Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 334 (1976) (plurality opinion) (rejecting
Louisiana's post-Furmanmandatory system); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280,30205 (1976) (plurality opinion) (rejecting the post-Furmanmandatory death penalty in North
Carolina).
215. See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 26, at 1434 ("Another possible remedial response to
race-of-the-victim disparities would be for the Court to retract its rejection of mandatory
death sentences.") (footnote omitted).
216. See Roberts, 428 U.S. at 334 ("Louisiana's mandatory death sentence statute also
fails to comply with Furman'srequirement that standardless jury discretion be replaced by
procedures that safeguard against the arbitrary and capricious imposition of death
sentences."); Woodson, 428 U.S. at 303 ("Instead of rationalizing the sentencing process, a
mandatory scheme may well exacerbate the problem identified in Furman .... ").
217. See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 26, at 1435 ("[S]uch laws would do nothing to constrain
the prior exercise of prosecutorial discretion."); Note, Discretionand the Constitutionalityof
the New Death Penalty Statutes, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1690, 1714 (1974) [hereinafter Discretion
and Constitutionality]("Regardless ofwhether sentencing discretion is restricted, enormous
pressures and incentives exist for prosecutors and pardoners to exercise discretion, thus
creating a substantial risk of inconsistent results.").
218. See Discretionand Constitutionality,supra note 217, at 1714-15 ("Furthermore, the
desire to achieve individualization of sentencing-a goal of prosecutors and judges alike-and
to alleviate the harshness of legislatively prescribed criminal penalties provides a strong
incentive for the exercise of discretion in capital cases.") (footnote omitted).
219. See, e.g., SEIDMAN & TUSHNET, supra note 33, at 160-61 ("Even a mandatory system
does not eliminate prosecutorial and police discretion, jury nullification, or bias built into the
definitions of the underlying crimes.").
220. See Scott W. Howe, Resolving the Conflict in the CapitalSentencing Cases:A DesertOriented Theory of Regulation,26 GA. L. REv. 323,367 (1992) ("[T]o the extent that the other
statutes preserved discretion at the sentencing phase, they left great potential for
arbitrariness.").
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leveling-up needed to eliminate racial disparities in capital
selection.2 2 '
C. Forced Narrowing
Limiting the use of the death penalty to a subset of highly
aggravated murders also has seemingly insurmountable problems.
The notion that states could attack racial bias by restricting the use
of the death penalty to narrow categories of murder has appeared
most notably in opinions by Justice Stevens.22 2 The theory behind
the approach is that racial disparities will fall if the death penalty
is only available for the very worst murders-those in which
prosecutors and jurors would usually favor the death penalty
regardless of racial factors. The Court has already forced some
narrowing of death eligibility through its proportionality rulings,
particularly Coker v. Georgia,2 23 which proscribed the death penalty
for rape and thereby eliminated a source of much racial discrimination in the use of the sanction. 224 Nonetheless, as a strategy for
eliminating rather than reducing racial disparities, the approach
appears unworkable.
First, a forced narrowing approach would require states to codify
irrational distinctions. Substantial narrowing would spare many
murderers, although the community would view them as even more
deserving of death than many others who could and would receive
a death sanction. 22 5 The worst murderers, according to community
221. Even more important in the final analysis, mandatory death penalties would fail to
acknowledge that many capital offenders do not deserve death. We will see that the central
protection that the Eighth Amendment imposes on the use of capital punishment is a
mandate that only those who deserve death should receive that sanction. See infra notes 28991 and accompanying text.
222. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 367 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("If
Georgia were to narrow the class of death-eligible defendants to (categories of highly
aggravated murders], the danger of arbitrary and discriminatory imposition of the death
penalty would be significantly decreased, if not eradicated.").
223. 433 U.S. 584, 600 (1977).
224. Id.; see also Carol S. Steiker, Commentary, Things FallApart, But the Center Holds:
The Supreme Court and the Death Penalty, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1475, 1487 (2002) (noting that
the decision eliminated from death eligibility a crime for which the penalty was imposed in
patterns reflecting pronounced racial discrimination).
225. See, e.g., Steiker & Steiker, supra note 10, at 416 ("The central drawback to such
forced narrowing is that it might force states to exclude factors from their definitions of
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standards, seem to fall into a broad array of different types of
murder that elude description in narrow and objective terms."' A
substantially narrowed class would inevitably underinclude those
deemed deserving of death, which is precisely why states have not
defined death eligibility in narrow and objective terms.227
A more overriding flaw with the approach lies in the Supreme
Court's inability to implement narrowing, short of abolition (or near
abolition), to solve the racial-discrimination problem. The Court
cannot describe all murders in which race is irrelevant.228 States
themselves have proven unable even to limit death eligibility to
categories in which prosecutors usually seek the death penalty,
much less categories in which the offenders so clearly warrant
death that racial bias will not matter. The legal system cannot
identify with objective standards the group of death-worthy cases
in which race bias is irrelevant.229
The Supreme Court could try to force narrowing without
specifying which murderers merit death."' The Court could simply
order states to narrow to a degree that one-in-five or one-in-ten
eligible offenders received a death sanction. 23 ' This approach would
capital murder that actually do capture the worst offenses and offenders.").
226. For an insightful warning against efforts to regularize capital sentencing through
objective standards, see McGautha v. California,402 U.S. 183, 204 (1971), in which Justice
Harlan noted that "[tlo identify before the fact those characteristics of criminal homicides
and their perpetrators which call for the death penalty, and to express these characteristics
in language which can be fairly understood and applied by the sentencing authority, appear
to be tasks which are beyond present human ability."
227. This point suggests why arbitrariness in the use of the death penalty is impossible
to avoid. See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 10, at 416 ("If this is true, though, it is not merely
an indictment of the strategy of forced narrowing; it is a concession that administration of
the death penalty is inevitably arbitrary.").
228. The Baldus researchers only noted that there were categories that could be identified
with combinations of numerous variables in which race seemed not to matter. See BALDUS
ETAL., supra note 12, at 399-400. The researchers' conclusion does not mean, however, that
the categories would accord with relatively simple statutory language defining death
eligibility.
229. See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 26, at 1431 ("The one thing upon which death penalty
deregulators and death penalty abolitionists agree" is that identifying with objective
measures those who should get the death penalty is not a realistic expectation of the legal
system.).
230. See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 10, at 415-17 (discussing the advantages and
disadvantages of this approach).
231. See id. at 415 ("Thus, if experience over the past two decades reflects that one percent
of all murders results in a death sentence, the class of the death-eligible should not be
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avoid embroiling the Court in precisely defining death eligibility
while also allowing states some room to disagree about which
murderers should face possible execution.
Unfortunately, this proportional-rule strategy also founders as a
way to eliminate racial disparities. The Court would have no basis
to know what ratio between the number of death sentences and the
number of death-eligible offenders would produce a near-zero level
of racial disparities. The ratio would likely depend on numerous
factors that vary over time and across jurisdictions. Relevant
factors might include the nature of the statutory aggravators used
to define death eligibility, the eccentricities and relative aggressiveness of the prosecutors in charge of capital cases, the levels of public
funding available to support death-penalty prosecutions, and the
level of public concern about crime during a particular period. In
addition, no adequate method would exist for determining whether
the proportion chosen in a particular state was working. The
litigation that would arise over how to set the ratio and how to
measure outcomes in different states over time would greatly
burden the courts and largely thwart executions.2"'
These problems disqualify forced narrowing as a plausible
strategy to eliminate racial bias in capital selection. Of course, the
Supreme Court could simply make up a moderately demanding
narrowing rule, declare the problem solved, and ignore the realities.
In the fashion of its McCleskey opinion, the Justices could decline
to allow proof that the rule chosen did not succeed. 3 3 At a price of
tremendously greater than, say, five or ten percent of all murders" rather than the current
ratio, which is "closer to ninety-to-one than five- or ten-to-one.").
232. The Court also could not circumvent the problems by overcompensating so as to
minimize the chances of including cases in which race could matter. This strategy itself risks
producing near abolition. Also, the Justices would still not know how to define even this
extreme level of narrowing--except that the death-eligible group should be tiny. Further,
even if the Justices could decide initially on a rule of death eligibility, they would have no
definitive way to know whether the rule chosen was working. The additional morass of
litigation stalling executions and occupying courts would remain.
233. In McCleskey the Court stated:
Because McCleskey's sentence was imposed under Georgia sentencing
procedures that focus discretion "on the particularized nature of the crime and
the particularized characteristics of the individual defendant," ... we lawfully
may presume that McCleskey's death sentence was not "wantonly and
freakishly" imposed ... and thus that the sentence is not disproportionate within
any recognized meaning under the Eighth Amendment.
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forcing states to codify irrational distinctions and of substantially
reducing the use of capital punishment, this strategy might reduce
somewhat the racial disparities. The strategy, however, would not
constitute a true solution to the racial-bias problem.
D. Mandated Near-Zero Disparity Outcomes
The final approach, involving Supreme Court rejection of death
sentences shown by statistical evidence to reflect racial bias, would
also founder. This approach contemplates that states would find
their own ways to eliminate the disparities when faced with
Supreme Court demands for neutrality and, if not, that the federal
courts would step in. Problems again arise, however, from the
inability to eliminate racial disparities without severely undermining the use of capital punishment and from the inability of the
federal courts to avoid an administrative morass.
1. The Futility of State Efforts to Achieve Racial Neutrality
Without Undermining the Use of the Death Penalty
The first problem with the theory of mandated near-zero
disparity outcomes is that states themselves can pursue the goal
only by curtailing the use of the death penalty. Efforts to "levelup"-to increase the proportion of death penalties in racial categories where death sentences are less utilized-could not succeed.23 4
Neither could efforts to "re-select-to maintain current levels of
death sentencing while promoting proportionate levels of death
selection in the various racial categories. Consequently, aggressive
death-penalty states face serious disincentives to rectify racial
disparities in their selection systems.
Leveling-up or re-selection efforts would not work principally
because states lack sufficient control over the main arbiters in
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 308 (1987); id. at 313 ("Despite these imperfections, our
consistent rule has been that constitutional guarantees are met when 'the mode [for
determining guilt or punishment] itself has been surrounded with safeguards to make it as
fair as possible.'") (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
234. KENNEDY, supra note 26, at 341 ("[Ilt would be better to remedy the problem ...
by
leveling up-increasing the number of people executed for murdering blacks-rather than
leveling down-abolishing capital punishment altogether.").
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capital selection. 5 As we have seen, the most important decisions
in capital selection are made by dozens of local District Attorneys'
offices and by juries, all acting independently.236 This diffused
decision making conflicts with the centralized state control required
to manipulate with some precision the number of death sentences
in various racial categories. 2 7 Without the means to generate more
death sentences in targeted categories-generally black-victim
cases-states could not make these plans work.23
States also could not feasibly implement reforms to enable
them to achieve the control necessary to level-up or re-select. A
requirement that all decisions to pursue a capital sentence funnel
through a central state agency for approval would not suffice. This
approach would only allow a veto of a decision to seek death, which
might help promote racial neutrality, but through leveling down
rather than leveling-up or re-selection. Only by reestablishing the
prosecutorial function in homicide cases in a central state agency
could a state hope to pursue such a plan. This kind of fundamental
reorganization, however, would involve great cost and controversy
and, in the end, would not necessarily eliminate the influence of
racial bias by prosecutors. 2 9 The state would still lack a solution to
235. Moreover, when properly understood, the Eighth Amendment problem that the
evidence of racial discrimination reveals is not solved by leveling-up proposals or by the
imposition of mandatory death penalties. Such proposals would treat the symptom, but not
the problem itself. The true Eighth Amendment concern is the inability of capital sentencers
issuing death sentences to find deserts appropriately. See infra text accompanying notes 289,
293.
236. See supra text accompanying notes 65-66.
237. Commentators who have advocated leveling-up or re-selection have not articulated
specific remedial plans. For example, Professor Randall Kennedy, a mild abolitionist, has
advocated the general notion of leveling-up as a way that states might meet a federal
demand for racial neutrality. KENNEDY, supra note 26, at 345 n.* ('I oppose capital
punishment ... [but] am not ... a fervent abolitionist."); see also Kennedy, supra note 26, at
1436-38. He has also asserted that, if the effort failed, leveling down or abolition is an
acceptable alternative. See KENNEDY, supra note 26, at 344 (asserting that states could
"[e]ither respond as vigorously to the murders of blacks by condemning perpetrators of such
crimes to death (as is done to murderers of whites), or relinquish the power to put anyone
to death"). Of course, the practicalities of leveling-up or re-selection take on much more
importance to those who would not want a plan to fail than to those willing to accept
disintegration of the effort into abolition.
238. Retentionists generally do not believe that such plans would work. See supra note 28.
239. The Justice Department has provided some top-down review regarding death-penalty
decisions in homicide prosecutions in the federal system. Serious doubt remains, however,
that those efforts have eliminated the influence of unconscious racial bias, in part because
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the discretion exercised by juries, since the capital defendant's right
2 40
to jury decisions is constitutionally enshrined.
Even if states could control the death-selection decisions by
prosecutors and juries adequately to level-up or to re-select,2 4 1 the
efforts would probably violate the Equal Protection Clause.2" 2
Unlike the unconscious racial bias that currently infects capital
selection,'" a state plan to level-up or to re-select would amount to
conscious discrimination. Proponents could push such a plan as an

the review has covered only those death cases in the federal system in which a death
sentence was actually sought. See, e.g., Rory K. Little, The Federal Death Penalty: History
and Some Thoughts About the Departmentof Justice'sRole, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 347,489
(1999):
But if unconscious racial empathy is affecting decisions in the field to decline
or accept certain murder cases as federal cases, or to later accept non-death
pleas or not, Main Justice reviewers must be aware of the entire universe of
cases in which such unconscious effects might manifest themselves before they
can address them.
Id. (footnote omitted). The Justice Department under Attorney General John Ashcroft
recently has altered the federal protocols to give more control to main Justice Department
officials over all death-penalty decisions in the federal system. However, the effort appears
focused on ensuring more geographical equity in federal decisions regarding death rather
than on reducing the influence of racial bias. See, e.g., Dan Christensen, FederalProsecutors
Orderedto Seek Death Penalty, BROWARD DAILY Bus. REV., Jan. 29, 2003, at Al.
240. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002) (holding that a capital defendant is
entitled to a jury determination regarding the existence of any facts defining death
eligibility); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) (holding that the right to trial by
jury on guilt-or-innocence questions in felony cases is "fundamental to the American scheme
of justice" and thus is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment).
241. Some have suggested that, faced with an alternative of leveling-up or re-selection
versus leveling-down or, abolition, states would find a way to encourage prosecutors and
juries to level-up. See Kennedy, supra note 26, at 1436 ("This plan would encourage state
officials to change the sentencing habits of prosecutors, juries, and judges because, unless
they did so, the state would be precluded permanently from executing anyone."). The specific
methods by which states could encourage the substantial and targeted increases by
prosecutors are hard to imagine. How states could successfully encourage white juries to put
aside their tendencies to empathize more with white victims than with black victims is even
more mysterious. See Stephen L. Carter, Comment, When Victims Happen To Be Black, 97
YALE L.J. 420, 445 (1988) ("But in a society where racialist categorizations survive, there is
no sensible way to finish the sentence. People will bring preconceptions to the jury box as
long as preconceptions exist.").
242. See Steiker & Steiker, supranote 10, at 420 ("flIt is doubtful whether state actors can
constitutionally attempt to compensate for anticipated sentencer discrimination by reacting
differently to murders based on the race of the victim.").
243. Regarding the constitutional issues raised by the unconscious racial bias that
currently affects capital selection, see supra text accompanying notes 211-13.
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effort to remedy past discrimination.2 44 They could argue that
reversing past white-victim bias would benefit black citizens who
previously have received a short share of a public service.2 45 Unlike
permissible governmental efforts to remedy past discrimination,
however, the notion that criminal penalties benefit particular racial
groups is itself debatable. Also, unlike permissible efforts to remedy
past discrimination, leveling-up or re-selection would impose an
extreme penalty on persons who would not otherwise have suffered
it and who bear no connection to the previous wrongs.246 Consequently, these efforts, even if not otherwise unworkable, would
probably fail on legal grounds.24 7
Death-penalty states surely could pursue leveling-down
methods that would help reduce racial disparities. The methods
might include imposing more procedural protections in capital
cases, narrowing death eligibility to a tiny category of the very
worst murders, or reversing death sentences that statistical
evidence suggests are racially biased."" However, these approaches
tend to thwart states' ability to use the death penalty, and
aggressive death-penalty states would generally not pursue them

244. See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 10, at 420 ("Of course, the Court might regard some
'affru-mative action' efforts in capital sentencing as the appropriate corrective to longstanding
prosecutorial and sentencer indifference to the plight of minority victims.").
245. See Kennedy, supra note 26, at 1394 (portraying the issue of white-victim bias in
capital selection "as an instance of racial inequality in the provision of public goods").
246. See KENNEDY, supra note 26, at 344 ("[E]ven those who favor, or at least tolerate,
race-conscious remedies in some contexts reach a point where they find that such remedies
are simply too severe to impose upon individuals who themselves played no direct part in
inflicting the initial injury.").
247. See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 10, at 420.
248. Some researchers, most notably Professor David Baldus, have argued for the latter
approach. He has advocated the use of statistical monitoring systems by appellate courts to
detect and eliminate raciallybiased death sentences. See Baldus et al., supra note 6, at 359
("With proper procedures and firm enforcement ofproscriptions against racial discrimination,
we argue, capital sentencing systems can be largely purged of the discrimination that
currently exists.").
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voluntarily.2 49 This point leads to the second problem with the
theory of mandated near-zero disparities.
2. The Problems for the United States Supreme Court in
EnforcingNear-Zero DisparityLevels
The Supreme Court could not feasibly enforce a mandate of nearzero disparities. First, the Justices have no more ability than the
states to spur near-zero disparities without also causing severe
leveling-down in the use of capital punishment. Second, serious
efforts by the Supreme Court to force the result would spur neverending litigation that would greatly tax the federal judiciary and
virtually ensure a long and widespread breakdown in the use of
capital punishment.
The Supreme Court could not avoid the reality that achieving
near-zero disparities would require reversing a significant percentage of all death sentences. The disparities between capital sentencing rates in white-victim and black-victim cases typically have been
large. For example, in the Baldus study from Georgia, the researchers concluded that a defendant was 4.3 times more likely to receive
a death sentence simply because his victim was white rather than
black.2 5 ° Attempts to identify racial discrimination on an individualized basis are also fraught with subjectivity, even speculation.2 5 '
Avoiding those problems might require reversing a large portion of
the death sentences issued in white-victim cases, which could also
252
mean a significant portion of all death sentences handed down.
249. Kentucky and New Jersey have taken steps beyond any required by federal law to
address the potential for unconscious racial discrimination in capital selection. The Kentucky
statute provides little protection to capital defendants, however, see supranote 17 (discussing

the limitations to a racial-bias challenge imposed by the Kentucky statute), and New Jersey
does not qualify as an aggressive death-penalty state. See supranote 35 (noting that, by the
end of March, 2004, New Jersey had not executed a single person in the post-Furmanera and
had only fifteen persons on death row).
250. See BALDUS ETAL., supra note 12, at 154.
251. The Baldus researchers contended that subsets of cases that they classified as falling
in the mid-range of aggravation accounted for most of the unexplained racial disparities. See,
e.g., id. at 154 tbl.32. However, the researchers' mid-range of cases in which the racial
disparities existed constituted a very significant percentage ofall the cases. See id. at 153-54.
Also, the authors of the Baldus Study concede that there is a variety of ways to classify cases
as similar. See id. at 84-97.
252. In many other death-penalty states, achieving parity would require a similarly large
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Additional reversals required to remedy race-of-defendant discrimination would cause further erosion.25
The Court could make half-hearted efforts, but punt the problem,
by requiring defendants to prove by a high standard that discrimination influenced their death sentences. This approach would allow
a conclusion in many cases that discrimination was not proven,
given the highly speculative nature of efforts to identify racial bias
in individual cases.254 The approach would not solve the discrimination problem, as statistical studies would likely continue to show
system-wide racial disparities.
A serious approach would involve recognizing a presumption of
racial discrimination based on system-wide statistical evidence,
which the state could attempt to rebut. Under this approach, many
intractable issues would arise over how to measure racial discrimination. The methodologies of the system-wide studies would face
attack,"' and questions would also arise over how to assess racial
discrimination in particular cases.256 The issues would produce
disagreements among the federal circuits, and ultimately would
require resolution by the Supreme Court. Until these questions
were resolved, numerous stays of execution would issue regularly,
thwarting executions.
A Supreme Court decision on a methodological issue would likely
also have limited precedential value. Claims from other states
based on different studies would often raise different problems.
Even in the same state, a different case might present new or
number of reversals. See supra Part II.B.
253. The Baldus Study from Georgia found that, within the white-victim cases, a black
defendant was 2.4 times more likely to receive a death sentence simply because he was black
rather than white. See BALDUS ETAL., supranote 12, at 141.
254. See Scott W. Howe, The Constitutionand CapitalSentencing:PursuingJusticeand
Equality, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 749, 774-75 (1992) (discussing the inherent problems of any
"individualized approach to determining appropriate relief").
255. For example, it is unapparent whether the proper group measures from which to
infer discrimination in individual cases should focus on state-wide results or on smaller
categories, such as all urban and all rural cases. Likewise, there are no generally agreed
upon time frames for group measures. The number and nature of variables to be assessed
and controlled in the governing statistical model are also not self-evident. How the facts in
individual cases should be determined also raises controversies, particularly given the need
to include cases in which there is no trial and, thus, no evidentiary record. Id. at 772-78.
256. See, e.g., id. at 774-75 (discussing the "unresolvable problems" of attempting to
individualize relief).
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somewhat different methodological issues. Also, a new study in the
same state focusing on expanded or different periods could imply
racial discrimination even after rejection of discrimination claims
based on a prior study. The continuing litigation would tax the
federal courts heavily and likely stall most executions for years.
In the end, racial neutrality in the use of the death penalty
carries more than a heavy price. Critics of the Court's capitalsentencing decisions are prone to imply that the Supreme Court
was not serious after 1976 about the Furman ideal of equality.257
The more insightful point is one made by Justice Scalia in his
private memorandum to the other Justices during the McCleskey
litigation.25 s Racial discrimination in capital selection appears
ineradicable, as a practical matter, through federal regulation.259
IV. THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT ARGUMENT FOR ABOLITION BASED
ON UNCONSCIOUS RACIAL DISCRIMINATION

The conclusion that only abolition can remedy the racial discrimination problem raises the question whether the abolition remedy
can find justification in the Constitution. Since the 1976 Cases,26
257. See, e.g., Howe, supra note 7, at 861 (noting that the Court's stated goal of
"'nonarbitrariness' or 'consistency' in the use of the death penalty ... does not describe what
the Court has actually accomplished, for capital sentencers can be-and are--given virtually
as much discretion under the Court's Eighth Amendment doctrine as they were given in the
pre-Furmanera.").
258. See supra text accompanying notes 193-94.
259. See Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Black Man's Burden: Race and the Death Penalty in
America, 81 OR. L. REV. 15, 37 (2002) ("[A]t some point we must conclude that perhaps the
problem cannot be remedied.").
260. In a famous quintet of cases decided on July 2, 1976, the Court upheld the capital
sentencing systems of Georgia, Florida, and Texas, but struck down as overly mandatory the
systems of North Carolina and Louisiana. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976)
(upholding a Georgia statute that required the jury and judge to consider aggravating and
mitigating factors in deciding whether to impose the death penalty on a convicted murderer);
Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) (upholding a Florida statute requiring the trial judge,
after a jury recommendation, to weigh aggravating factors against mitigating factors in
deciding whether to impose a death sentence on a convicted murderer); Jurek v. Texas, 428
U.S. 262 (1976) (upholding a Texas statute that required the jury to answer three special
questions affilrmatively as a prerequisite to the imposition of a death sentence on one
convicted of certain forms of aggravated murder); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280
(1976) (striking down a North Carolina statute mandating the death penalty for those
convicted of first-degree murder); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976) (striking down
a Louisiana statute mandating the death penalty for persons convicted of certain aggravated
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scholarly attention has not focused on this question. The dearth of
commentary finds some explanation in the Supreme Court's
rejection of abolition after Furman and its later rejection in
McCleskey of calls based on racial discrimination to invalidate
Georgia's capital-selection system. The Court's post-Furman and
post-McCleskey decisions on capital sentencing, however, suggest
a theory for understanding why racial discrimination justifies
abolition under the Eighth Amendment. This Part develops the
explanation in three stages. First, it explains why we should
understand the Eighth Amendment to embody a substantive
limitation on the use of capital punishment-that only those who
deserve the death penalty should suffer death. Second, it explains
why the evidence of racial bias in capital selection reveals widespread violations of the deserts limitation, regardless of whether
the decision makers acted with discriminatory purpose. Finally, it
explains why abolition is an appropriate solution to the problem,
taking account of probable arguments not already addressed
favoring preservation of the capital sanction.
2 61

A. The Deserts Limitation on the Use of the Death Penalty

An important key to the racial-discrimination argument for
abolition lies in recognizing that the Eighth Amendment speaks to
the issue of who can receive a death sentence and does so in terms
that should govern the capital sentencer. The Supreme Court has
rationalized its capital sentencing rules as an effort to promote
consistency in capital selection.2 62 A consistency principle does not
explain the Court's decisions on capital punishment, however, and
makes no sense under the Eighth Amendment. The principle that
best explains the Court's rulings and that gives plausible meaning
to the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause is the deserts
murders).
261. I have developed the ideas presented in this section more extensively elsewhere. See,
e.g., Howe, supra note 7, at 811-23, 829-35; Howe, supra note 28, at 403-11, 438-43.
262. See, e.g., Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420,427 (1980) ("A capital sentencing scheme
must, in short, provide a 'meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which [the
penalty] is imposed from the many cases in which it is not.'") (alteration in original) (quoting
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 313 (1976) (White, J., concurring)); see generally, Howe,
supranote 28, at 403-11 (recounting the development of this consistency principle beginning
with Furman).
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limitation-that only those who deserve death should receive that
sanction.
The deserts limitation aims at avoiding retributive excess. The
limitation means that capital sentencers should base decisions
for death on the deserts of the offender rather than on utilitarian
concerns. A capital sentence should not rest, for example, on
judgments that death would incapacitate a particularly dangerous
offender, cost less than life imprisonment, or deter other potential
murderers. A jury might view a seventeen-year-old capital murderer as short-sighted and impulsive and thus especially dangerous.
Nonetheless, ifjudged not to deserve death because of his youth, he
should not receive a death sanction.263 Likewise, correctly or not,
some might think a death sentence for a contract killing could help
deter other similar murders. If the killer does not deserve death
due to mitigating factors such as childhood abuse, 26 ' however, the
capital sentencer should opt for life imprisonment.6 5
The Supreme Court's decisions on proportionality in capital
sentencing reflect this deserts limitation. The Court has rejected
the death penalty as too severe under the Eighth Amendment in
certain circumstances. In reaching these decisions, the Court has
looked for evidence of a societal consensus that the death penalty
is not widely employed in the relevant context. The Court has
263. Cf Stanfordv. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361,374-75 (1989) (holding that states can execute

offenders who were sixteen or seventeen when they committed their crimes in part because
the individualization doctrine allows consideration on a case-by-case basis of whether they

warrant a death sentence).
The number of sixteen- and seventeen-year-old offenders who are later executed is small

in absolute terms and relative to the number who commit murder, suggesting a widespread
sense that they generally do not deserve capital punishment. See Victor L. Streib, Excluding
Juvenilesfrom New York's Impendent Death Penalty,54 ALB. L. REV. 625,658 (1990) (stating
that only about 2.4% of all executions are of persons who committed offenses when under age

eighteen).
264. See, e.g., Phyllis L. Crocker, ChildhoodAbuseand Adult Murder:Implicationsfor the
Death Penalty, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1141, 1179 (1999) ("A history of childhood abuse is
paradigmatic of mitigating evidence because it has the potential to transform how a juror

perceives the defendant and his commission of the murder.").
265. An individualizedjudgment at sentencing about the moral deserts ofretarded capital
murderers decided their fate until the Supreme Court recently prohibited the death penalty
for such offenders. See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (prohibiting the death
penalty for retarded offenders); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (setting forth the preAtkins view that, while the death penalty is not prohibited for retarded offenders, the
sentencer must be free to reject the death penalty based on the reduced culpability of the

offender due to retardation).
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ultimately applied its own judgment to the excessiveness
question, 266 however, and that judgment has been grounded on
notions of deserts. For example, in Coker v. Georgia,26 7 the Court
rejected the death penalty for the rape of an adult woman where
no life was taken. Coker unquestionably posed a future danger, so
executing him would have served utilitarian ends. 268 He had
escaped from prison to commit the charged capital rape while
serving multiple life sentences for an earlier murder of one rape
victim and the near murder of another. 26 9 Rejection of the death
penalty in those circumstances necessarily implied that the
death penalty is inappropriate when not deserved for the charged
offense. 2 0 Likewise, the Court's subsequent proportionality
decisions on capital punishment have continued to reflect the
deserts limitation, although the Justices have also asked whether
objective evidence reveals a societal consensus against the death
penalty in the relevant context. 1
The Court's Eighth Amendment decisions regulating capital
sentencing trials also serve this prohibition against retributive
excess. 2 The central requirement of capital sentencing, beyond
266. See, e.g., Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312-13 (asserting that, where a consensus exists, the
Court will ask whether there is a basis to disagree); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597
(1977) (plurality opinion) (asserting that questions as to the propriety of the death penalty
under the Eighth Amendment are ultimately up to the Justices' own judgment).
267. Coker, 433 U.S. at 597 (plurality opinion).
268. See, e.g., Herbert L. Packer, Making the Punishment Fitthe Crime, 77 HARV. L. REV.
1071, 1079-80 (1964) (asserting that the death penalty for rape is no more questionable than
the death penalty for murder if death sentences can be justified on incapacitation or general
deterrence rationales).
269. See Coker, 433 U.S. at 605 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (noting Coker's escape from
prison for his prior offenses and the brutal nature of the prior crimes and the charged
offense).
270. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAw 45 (2d ed. 1995) (stating that
the Coker opinion revealed that "Justice White applied a strictly retributive conception of
proportionality").
271. See, e.g.,Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318 (prohibiting the death penalty for retarded offenders
on grounds that they generally lacked the "personal culpability to justify that sanction);
Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 336 (1989) (plurality opinion) (quoting the language from
Tison); Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 149 (1987) (emphasizing that the question is one of
appropriate retribution, which focuses on "the personal culpability of the criminal offender").
272. I have elsewhere rejected on prudential grounds a role for the Supreme Court in
regulating capital sentencing under this desert limitation. At the same time, I have argued,
as I do here, that the desert limitation appropriately translates the Eighth Amendment as
it applies to capital punishment, best rationalizes the Court's capital sentencing doctrine,
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the minimal narrowing rule, 273 is the individualization mandate of

Lockett v. Ohio,27 4 which holds that a capital sentencer must remain
free to reject the death penalty based on any evidence that the
offender presents regarding his character, record, or crime.275 This
mandate could only build on the deserts limitation. Individualized
consideration would lack justification if utilitarian goals, such as
deterring other potential murderers or avoiding the perceived costs
of imprisoning an offender, could support a death sentence.
Categorical approaches to sentencing, determined in advance by the
legislature, could serve utilitarian ends.276 In contrast, there is now
a societal consensus that myriad individual factors bear on
deserts,
so that a finding of guilt alone cannot automatically
render a death sentence deserved, even when the legislature defines
the capital crime in highly aggravated terms.27 ' The desert assessand best describes the capital sentencer's normative role under the Eighth Amendment. See
generally Howe, supra note 7, at 835-43.
273. See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
274. 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (plurality opinion).
275. In Lockett the Court stated:
[Wie conclude that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the
sentencer, in all but the rarest kind of capital case, not be precluded from
considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or
record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers
as a basis for a sentence less than death.
Id. at 604 (footnotes omitted); see also id. at 620-21 (Marshall, J., concurring) (noting that the
Ohio statute "wholly fails to recognize the unique individuality of every criminal defendant").
276. That some relevant utilitarian questions concerning the use of the death penalty call
for individualized consideration also would notjustify the individualization rule as an Eighth
Amendment mandate. For example, individualized consideration could help resolve the
utilitarian question whether to execute to negate future harm by an offender. No apparent
Eighth Amendment theory would explain, however, why a state should focus on one
utilitarian question rather than another.
277.
Once we know not only the kind of offense a person has committed, but the
circumstances in which it was performed, whether he did it deliberately, the
kind of pressures on him when he did it, his whole psychological 'set,' and a host
of other factors, we have much more data for deciding what he deserves than
when we know only the type of crime he committed and then attempt to
correlate the gravity of that type of crime with the gravity of the punishment.
John Hospers, Retribution: The Ethics of Punishment, in ASSESSING THE CRIMINAL:
RESTITUTION, RETRIBUTION, AND THE LEGAL PROCESS 181, 190 (1977) (Randy E. Barnett &

John Hagel III eds., 1977).
278. See, e.g., Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 82-85 (1987) (rejecting mandatory death
penalty for murder by an inmate serving a life term); Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633,
637-38 (1977) (rejecting a statute mandating death penalty for the murder of a police officer).
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ment requires a capital-sentencing hearing at which the capital
sentencer can weigh a broad array of information. The inquiry
allows a nuanced determination to help ensure 27that
no person
9
receives a death sentence who does not deserve it.
The deserts limitation also provides sensible meaning to the
language in the Eighth Amendment. The relevant clause prohibits
punishments that are "cruel and unusual." Since Furman, only
about 300 of the roughly 21,000 homicides committed annually in
this country have ended with a death sentence.280 Given the low
absolute number of death sentences and the low proportion of death
sentences for homicides, capital sentences can readily be thought
unusual. More importantly, the imposition of an undeserved death
sentence can itself be thought unusual and, certainly, it is cruel.
The idea comports with basic notions of justice.2 8 ' The Supreme
Court has not applied so stringent a rule regarding long prison
terms,8 2 but they are not as absolute and irrevocable as an
execution. When applied to the death penalty, the deserts limitation
provides a fair reading of the Eighth Amendment.
Eighth Amendment restrictions on capital punishment are not
justified on the theory that they promote consistent treatment of
279. The minimal narrowing rule also finds explanation as an effort to ensure that only
the deserving receive death. Reducing even marginally the group subject to the death
penalty, by requiring the finding of an aggravating circumstance, reduces the chances that
an undeserving offender will receive a death sentence. In contrast, the narrowing
requirement does little, if anything, to ensure consistency in the disposition of capital
offenders. See Howe, supra note 7, at 815, 833.
280. See Liebman, supra note 70, at 2052 ("Since Furman,an average of about 300 of the
approximately 21,000 homicides committed in the United States each year have resulted in
a death sentence.") (footnote omitted).
Recently, for reasons that are unclear, the number of persons sentenced to death has
dropped well below historical averages. Only 155 defendants received death sentences in
2001, and an even lower number did in 2002. See, e.g., For First Time Since 1976, Drop in
Inmates on Death Row, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2002, at A20 (noting the low numbers of death
sentences in 2001 and 2002 compared with prior years).
281. See Hospers, supra note 277, at 183 (asserting that most people believe that treating
criminals according to their deserts is the embodiment of justice); Paul H. Robinson,
PunishingDangerousness:Cloaking PreventiveDetention as CriminalJustice, 114 HARV. L.
REV. 1429, 1429 n.1 (2001) (noting that lay persons generally believe that desert principles
should justify criminal punishments).
282. In noncapital cases, the Court has deferred to state legislative judgment except on
finding gross disproportionality. See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957,997-98 (1991)
(plurality opinion) (upholding mandatory sentence of life imprisonment for possession of 650
or more grams of cocaine).
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offenders. First, this theory does not explain the Court's capitalsentencing decisions. The Court's work in modestly narrowing the
application of the death penalty and in requiring individualized
consideration at the capital-sentencing stage does little to promote
equal treatment of all those who are potentially subject to the death
penalty. Opportunities remain throughout the capital selection
process for arbitrary reprieves of death-eligible offenders by police,
prosecutors, trial judges, juries, and state executives. Even among
those actually convicted of capital crimes, the Court's regulatory
efforts do little to promote consistency. After a capital conviction,
prosecutors and capital sentencers retain nearly as much discretion
to reprieve offenders arbitrarily as in the pre-Furmanera.28 3 The
basis for separating those who receive death from those who are
spared continues to appear irrational.
Consistency also does not provide sensible meaning to the Eighth
Amendment. A consistency command assumes that the Eighth
Amendment imposes no particular substantive limits on the use of
the death penalty. It assumes that distributing death sentences
according to various substantive standards can suffice as long as
states consistently apply the chosen standard. This view would
mean that even harsh rules, if consistently followed, would become
acceptable. A state could then disallow capital offenders the
opportunity to obtain merciful reprieves from death sentences on
grounds that doing so would protect them from cruel and unusual
punishment. Of course, this outcome stands the cruel and unusual
punishments prohibition on its head."' The Eighth Amendment
aims to prevent execution of the undeserving, not to ensure that all
who meet a particular standard receive that punishment.
The consistency theory also fails to explain why racial bias in
capital sentencing should matter very much. The theory contains no
substance. 2s" Even without knowing the substantive measure that
283. See, e.g., Steiker & Steiker, supra note 10, at 436 (asserting that "the pre-Furman
world of unreviewable sentencer discretion lives on, with much the same consequences in

terms of arbitrary and discriminatory sentencing patterns"); see also supra Part I.C
(discussing the limited role of Supreme Court doctrine in controlling prosecutorial
discretion).
284. See, e.g., Daniel D. Polsby, The Death of CapitalPunishment? Furman v. Georgia,
1972 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 27 (asserting that pursuing nonarbitrariness in capital selection as an
Eighth Amendment goal involves a "profound contradiction").
285. Consistency, like equality, is an empty prescription in that it fails to provide a
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should govern capital sentencing, we might think that racial
discrimination exemplifies inconsistent treatment.2 86 Absent the
substantive measure, however, it remains unclear why unconscious
racial discrimination should matter enough to invalidate death
sentences. Unless those sentenced to death are treated unjustly,
they should not necessarily escape that punishment simply because
others who appear similarly situated escape. If the point is only
that there is inconsistency, we should feel badly, but mostly for the
victims whose convicted killers were spared.28 7 Unconscious racial
discrimination in capital sentencing clearly matters enough to
invalidate death sentences only if we recognize that the purpose of
the sentencing hearing is to resolve a substantive question ofjustice
on which race has no bearing.
B. Racial Discriminationas a Violation of the Deserts Limitation
When we recognize that the Eighth Amendment embodies a
desert limitation on capital selection, racial discrimination in
capital selection matters greatly. The race of a capital offender
or of his victim has no relevance in determining the moral
deserts of the offender for the capital crime.2 88 Because the
measure by which to judge when persons have been treated equally or differently. See, e.g.,
Howe, supra note 28, at 368-76. Except in extraordinary circumstances, judgments about
equality become possible only in relation to a standard external to equality. Compare
Christopher J. Peters, Equality Revisited, 110 HARv. L. REV. 1210, 1232-54 (1997)
(contending that nonegalitarian justice is what controls even when equality is asserted as
guiding the decision on appropriate treatment of persons), and Peter Westen, The Empty
Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REv. 537, 559-77 (1982) (contending that equality alone does
not lead to a method for deciding what is appropriate treatment of people), with Kent
Greenawalt, How Empty is the Idea of Equality?, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1167, 1178-79 (1983)
(contending that there may be a few cases, exemplified by parents' treatment of their
children, in which equality itself has normative force).
286. See, e.g., Bandes, supra note 202, at 397 ("[Taking an easy example, the law ought
not to condone punishment of a defendant that varies according to the social class or the race
of his victim.").
287. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 103-458, at 14 (1994) (asserting that "the solution would be
to seek the death penalty in more cases in which black defendants murder black victims");
Scheidegger, supra note 184, at 126 ("Instead of demanding leniency for those who murder
whites, it is time to demand justice for all murder victims, white or black."); van den Haag,
The Ultimate Punishment,supra note 27, at 1663 ("The ideal of equal justice demands that
justice be equally distributed, not that it be replaced by equality.").
288. See, e.g., Lempert, supranote 38, at 1178 (asserting that "the just desert theory" does
not permit race "to dominate indicia of moral culpability in determining punishment")
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Eighth Amendment function of the capital sentencer is to ensure as
a prerequisite to a death sentence that the offender deserves death,
consideration of race renders the sentencing judgment improper.
When capital sentencers rely on inappropriate factors like race, the
death sentences they issue are not deserved. 8 9
Acknowledging the deserts limitation also undermines the
common argument that racial discrimination in capital selection,
while unfortunate, does not support abolition or any level-down
remedy. The deserts limitation makes irrelevant the argument that
those who deserve death do not deserve death any less, simply
because others who should also receive death are spared.2 90 That
argument assumes that those who have received death sentences
deserve them. A death sentence is not deserved, however, if racial
discrimination influenced the sentencer.2 9 '
Evidence that the principal problem in capital selection is race-ofvictim rather than race-of-defendant discrimination also does not
ameliorate the constitutional concern. Racial discrimination in
capital sentencing invalidates the deserts finding that justifies a
death sentence whether the discrimination stems from white-victim
bias, black-defendant bias, or other racial bias. If the problem were
mere inconsistency in the treatment of those deserving death,
(footnote omitted).
289. See id. at 1178 n.5 ("To my knowledge no modem retributivist has argued that
unalterable personal characteristics such as race and sex may be properly considered in
assessing culpability for crime.").
290. See, e.g., SEIDMAN & TUSHNET, supra note 33, at 160 (suggesting than an offender

who deserves to die should not be reprieved merely because another defendant who deserves
death has avoided that sanction); McAdams, supra note 191, at 167 ("The fact that you
parked illegally and did not get a ticket does not relieve me of paying the fine when I do get
a parking ticket."); van den Haag, The Ultimate Punishment, supra note 27, at 1663
("Maldistribution of any punishment among those who deserve it is irrelevant to its justice
or morality.").
291. We have already seen that the finding of guilt of a capital crime would not suffice to
conclude that the offender deserved death. Eighth Amendment doctrine reveals that a
deserts assessment sufficient to support a death sentence should build on a nuanced
examination at the sentencing stage of the offender's character, record, and crime. See supra
notes 273-79 and accompanying text. This requirement reflects state practices, started in the
early nineteenth century, of rejecting mandatory death penalties in favor of a discretionary
judgment by the jury. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 290-93 (1976) (plurality
opinion) (noting the consistent trend away from mandatory death statutes, even for homicide,
beginning in the early 1800s); Douglas A. Berman, Foreword: Addressing Capital
Punishment Through Statutory Reform, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 1-2 (2002) ("The late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries also saw states ... move away from mandating death ....").
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certainly the black victims whose killers were reprieved would have
a greater claim to our sympathy than the killers of white victims
who were condemned.2 92 The true problem, however, is the invalidity of the deserts findings in a significant portion of the cases in
which death sentences have issued, and, on that score, all forms of
racial discrimination are equally subversive.293
The unconscious nature of racial discrimination also does not
eliminate the Eighth Amendment problem. Deserts assessments
become unreliable when influenced by racial bias regardless of
whether the decision maker has a purpose to discriminate on racial
grounds. To make out an equal protection violation, the Supreme
Court has required proof of purposeful discrimination.2 9 4 Unbounded by its own substantive standards, the equal protection
mandate demands judicial confinement, and requiring proof of
purposeful discrimination at least serves that larger goal. No
similar rationale, however, would justify a distinction between
purposeful and nonpurposeful discrimination in applying the
Eighth Amendment. To recognize only purposeful discrimination as
292. See, e.g., KENNEDY, supranote 26, at 341 ("[It would be better to remedy the problem
... by leveling up-increasing the number of people executed for murdering blacks-rather
than leveling down-abolishing capital punishment altogether."); Dolinko, supra note 26, at
583 ("If one takes the discrimination argument seriously, the primary victims of unfair
discrimination are not the persons who are put to death for killing whites, but the class of
black citizens, whose lives are being implicitly devalued."); Carter, supra note 241, at 446
("The problem is one of fairness to victims ....").
293. Evidence of racial discrimination in capital selection is likely only the most visible
portion of a much wider problem with irrationality in decisions to impose death. Many
irrelevant factors probably distort these decisions. One commentator has noted, for example,
that the reaction of capital-sentencing jurors will often differ depending on whether the
offender is from their town or another area. See Dershowitz Interview, supra note 2, at 331
(contending that large disparities arise surrounding whether the victim and defendants are
residents of the same town as the sentencing jury). Others have suggested that capitalsentencing jurors may empathize more, for example, with those who have attractive facial
characteristics or who are otherwise physically attractive. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S.
279, 317 (1987). These points suggest that we should understand racial discrimination as
only revealing a broader irrationality-that capital sentencers generally have more empathy
for the victims and the offenders they view as most like them or like those they find
physically appealing than for those they view as different or ugly. See Dershowitz Interview,
supra note 2, at 331 ("We value the life most of those who we are most like."). Even this
notion may not adequately express the breadth ofirrelevant factors that influence sentencers
deciding who will die.
294. See, e.g., McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 299 (rejecting McCleskey's equal-protection claim
on grounds that the statistical evidence did not establish purposeful discrimination).
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a violation of the Eighth Amendment is simply to undermine the
substantive rule embodied in the prohibition.
The socially-constructed nature of deserts judgments does not
undermine the view that racial discrimination in capital selection
violates the Eighth Amendment. In part because desert notions are
not eternally fixed, the Supreme Court faces difficulty defining
precisely when a capital offender warrants death for Eighth
Amendment purposes. Societal consensus about deserved punishment changes over time and often eludes accurate description.
Nonetheless, we know that the race of the offender or of the victim
should not bear on whether a capital offender deserves death. The
socially constructed nature of deserts determinations does not
prevent that conclusion.
Evidence of racial discrimination throughout the capital selection
process also remains relevant to proving that capital punishment
violates the Eighth Amendment. Perhaps not every act of racial
discrimination that occurs in capital selection in a death case
should violate the deserts limitation. Racial discrimination at any
stage, if purposeful, violates equal protection principles. In contrast,
the Eighth Amendment deserts limitation only requires an
assurance that the offender deserves death. If sentencing juries
based death sentences on valid deserts determinations, unconscious
racial discrimination at other stages would not matter. A jury
validly would have found each person sentenced to death to deserve
that sanction. We lack assurance, however, that capital sentencers
determine deserts appropriately.2 95 To ensure that death-sentenced
295. Sociological studies strongly imply that racial discrimination occurs at the final
capital-sentencing stage on a fairly widespread basis. The statistical evidence is less
consistent and compelling, however, than the evidence of racial discrimination in capital
sentencing overall. Several studies in particular jurisdictions have concluded that the most
pronounced racial discrimination occurs at this stage of the process. See, e.g., supra notes
165-70 and accompanying text (Baldus study in Philadelphia); supra notes 173-75 and
accompanying text (Pierce and Radelet study in Illinois). In contrast, researchers in some
jurisdictions have not identified racial bias at the sentencing stage. See, e.g., supra notes 13844 and accompanying text (Arkin study in Miami); supra notes 145-47 and accompanying text
(Klein and Rolph study in California). In some cases, researchers have not identified
discrimination at the sentencing stage even when they have found evidence of racial
discrimination by prosecutors at earlier stages. See, e.g., supra notes 126-31 and
accompanying text (Vito and Keil study in Kentucky). The conclusions to be drawn from
these latter studies are unclear. Racial discrimination by decision makers earlier in the
selection process can make very difficult the determinations whether capital sentencers have
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offenders deserve death, we arguably should conclude that the
Eighth Amendment requires racially neutral decisions at all stages
of the process.296 Even if we focus only on the sentencing stage,
evidence of racial discrimination throughout capital selection adds
to our doubts that capital sentencers issuing death sentences act
properly.
C. Justificationfor the Abolition Remedy
The question remains whether abolition is an appropriate
solution to the problem of improper desert findings. We have
already seen that the Supreme Court cannot, as a practical
matter, regulate away the racial disparities in capital selection.297
The remedial problem remains once we understand the Eighth
Amendment problem as impropriety in the deserts decisions
supporting death sentences (rather than mere racial inconsistency
among those deserving death).29" The only plausible remedy is
abolition. Nonetheless, retentionists would argue against abolition
despite the undeserved nature of many death sentences. The next
section sets forth the most important arguments that retentionists
would offer and shows why they are weak reasons to preserve
capital punishment.

acted fairly, since bias in the selection of the group subject to sentencer consideration may
tend to mask racial discrimination by the sentencer. See supra Part I.C.

296.
When a state cannot act consistently in such an important matter as
determining who shall die, those who invoke moral philosophy to demand that
the state be allowed to make that determination should be able to point to a
consensually validated principle which assures us that the inconsistency is

benign.
See, e.g., Lempert, supra note 38, at 1182 (footnote omitted).
297. See supra Part III.
298. The level-up proposals actually become inappropriate for another reason once we
understand the Eighth Amendment problem. Those proposals treat the racial disparities
without remedying the real problem of death sentences resting on improper desert findings.
The racial disparities are symptoms of this deeper Eighth Amendment concern.
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1. The Language of Other ConstitutionalProvisionsIndicates
That the Prohibitionon Cruel and Unusual Punishments Does
Not Call for Abolition of CapitalPunishment
Commentators frequently have contended that several clauses in
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments bear on whether the
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments in the Eighth
Amendment should proscribe the death penalty. The Fifth Amendment includes two provisions, governing grand-jury indictment and
double jeopardy, that protect capital defendants explicitly and,
thus, contemplate the use of capital punishment.299 The Due
Process Clauses in both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments also
protect against governmental taking of "life."30 0 Retentionists argue

that these provisions reveal the original intent or understanding of
the Eighth Amendment as not prohibiting the death penalty and,
thus, mean that capital punishment cannot violate the Eighth
Amendment today.0 1
299. The Fifth Amendment provides in pertinent part:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising
in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of
War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law ....
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
300. The Due Process Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment provides: "[Nlor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law...." Id.
amend. XIV.
301. See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, DEATH PENALTIES 47 (1982) ("[Slpecial safeguards in
application of the death penalty were provided by the Fifth Amendment precisely because
the Framers postulated that the death penalty was unaffected by the Eighth Amendment.");
BORK, supra note 33, at 213 ("[Tlhe Bill of Rights threw protections around the imposition
of the punishment and thus clearly showed that the death penalty itself was constituitonally
acceptable.") (footnote omitted); SCALIA, supra note 33, at 146 ("[P]rovision for the death
penalty in a Constitution that sets forth the moral principle of 'no cruel punishments' is
conclusive evidence that the death penalty is not (in the moral view of the Constitution)
cruel."); Richard A. Posner, The Constitutionas an Economic Document, 56 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 4, 34 (1987) (asserting that capital punishment does not violate the Eighth Amendment
in part because the sanction is presupposed by clauses in the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments).
Some who oppose capital punishment have at times also found the language in the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments to pose an obstacle to judicial abolition under the Eighth
Amendment. See, e.g., Sanford Levinson, Wrong But Legal?, NATION, Feb. 26, 1983, at 249
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The central answer to the originalist charge is that the specific
intentions or understandings of how the Eighth Amendment would
apply to the death penalty at the time of its adoption need not
prevent effectuation of the broader principles embodied in the
Eighth Amendment now."°2 One of the central challenges involved
with efforts to interpret the Constitution according to original
understandings is the inability to know the level of generality at
which to identify those understandings. We have seen that the
prohibition on "cruel and unusual punishments," as a linguistic
matter, can imply a deserts limitation on the use of the death
penalty." 3 This interpretation also comports with originalism. No
serious dispute exists that the Eighth Amendment originally
permitted the death penalty for murder and a wide variety of other
crimes.'" Capital offenders at that time, however, were generally
thought to deserve death,0 5 a perspective consistent with the
mandatory nature of the death sanction in the late eighteenth
century.0 ' What has changed during the last two centuries is not
the general principle but the results of its application. American
society has progressed in its views about the deserts of offenders,
as reflected in the narrowing of the crimes subject to the death
penalty and in the movement away from mandatory death sentences. 0 7 The decisions of the Supreme Court on proportionality in
(contending, despite personal opposition to the death penalty, that the specific
acknowledgment of the use of capital punishment in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
poses a serious obstacle for the view that the Eighth Amendment can proscribe the sanction).
302. See, e.g., SEIDMAN & TUSHNET, supra note 33, at 154 (contending that capital
punishment could violate the "general prohibition" in the Eighth Amendment "even if its
authors did not recognize this").
303. See supra text accompanying notes 280-81.
304. See, e.g., DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD
1789-1801, at 93-96 (1997) (noting that, in 1789, Congress enacted a comprehensive statute
defining numerous federal crimes and provided for the death penalty for many of them,
including a provision that allowed a federal court "after imposing a death sentence for
murder to order 'that the body of [the] offender ... be delivered to a surgeon for dissection'").
305. See generally, BANNER, supra note 1, at 13-16 (discussing the generally accepted
belief in America in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries that the death penalty was
just retribution); id. at 23 ("[C]apital punishment was accepted as a legitimate act of
retribution directed at a person responsible for his own actions.").
306. See, e.g., Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 289 (1976) ('At the time the
Eighth Amendment was adopted in 1791, the States uniformly followed the common-law
practice of making death the exclusive and mandatory sentence for certain specified
offenses.") (footnote omitted).
307. See, e.g., id. at 289-93 (discussing the historical trend away from expansive
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the use of capital punishment and on individualization and
narrowing in capital sentencing also best find explanation in this
deserts-limitation idea.3"' A view that the Eighth Amendment now
proscribes capital punishment would rest simply on the recently
accumulated evidence that regulatory efforts cannot satisfy the
deserts limitation. °9
Contending that the Eighth Amendment should apply in the
specific way that it applied when promulgated poses severe
problems for constitutional construction generally. Any approach
to constitutional understanding that fails to accommodate the
decision in Brown v. Board ofEducation l° cannot claim descriptive
or prescriptive credibility.3 1 ' Hence, even ardent originalists have
described Brown as consistent with originalism. 12 However, the
application of the death penalty and away from mandatory death penalties even for murder).
308. See supra Part IV.A.
309. This contention warrants a caveat. Three members of the current Supreme Court
believe, on originalist grounds, that the Eighth Amendment prohibits certain modes of
punishment but does not proscribe punishments merely because they are thought overly
severe for the crime committed. See, e.g., Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 488 (1993)
(Thomas, J., concurring) ('[Tihe better view is that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause was intended to place only substantive limitations on punishments ...."); Harmelin
v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 976 (1991) (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J.) ("[Tihe Clause
disables the Legislature from authorizing particular forms or 'modes' of punishment .... ").
The Court has long viewed the Eighth Amendment, however, as prohibiting punishments
that are deemed disproportional. In 1910, in Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910),
the Court struck down as inappropriate for a minor crime a sentence that involved at least
twelve years of hard labor, indefinite supervision, and the forfeiture of civil rights. The Court
stated: "Such penalties for such offenses amaze those who ... believe that it is a precept of
justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to offense." Id. at
366-67. Some have contended that Weems could find explanation in the prohibition on certain
modes of punishment. See, e.g., Packer, supra note 268, at 1075-76 (contending that the
nature of the punishment rather than a disproportionality analysis may actually have
explained the decision). In more modem times, however, the Court has followed the view
that the Eighth Amendment prohibits gross disproportionality in the use of noncapital
punishment, see, e.g., Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983) (invalidating life sentence without
parole for habitual offender who passed a bad check for one hundred dollars), and
disproportionality in the use of capital punishment. See, e.g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584,
599 (1977) (declaring death penalty excessive for rape of adult woman where no life was
taken).
310. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
311. See DWORKIN, supranote 33, at 300 (contending that the ability to explain the Brown
decision is "a test any constitutional theory must now pass").
312. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 33, at 81 (asserting that "[ilt is clear that [Brown] can be
rested" on "the original understanding of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment").
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Equal Protection Clause doubtless was not originally understood
to require integration in public schools or public institutions
generally.313 To avoid the problem created by this reality,
originalists have asserted that we should understand the Equal
3 14
Protection Clause at the general level of assuring black equality.

They then contend that, while originally segregation was viewed as
consistent with black equality, the two notions later came to be
viewed as conflicting, requiring the proscription of segregation. 15
By the same logic, choosing the original general principle over the
original specific application allows a construction of the Eighth
Amendment as imposing a deserts limitation on capital punishment
and, ultimately, as proscribing that sanction. If the Eighth Amendment had to implement the original understanding at the most
specific level, equal protection would also have to permit publicly
sanctioned segregation.316
The clauses in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments also do not
themselves forbid the prohibition of capital punishment. The Due
Process Clauses in the Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendment
merely prohibit denials of "life" without due process, and would
apply in noncriminal contexts even if the death penalty disappeared.317 Moreover, the references to capital cases in the Grand
Jury and Double Jeopardy Clauses do no more than contemplate
the use of the death penalty. They reveal at most that capital
punishment in 1791 did not infringe the general principle embodied
313. See DWORKIN, supranote 33, at 294 (noting that the promulgators of the Fourteenth

Amendment "shared the view ... that racial segregation of public schools did not violate the
clause" and that "[n] one of them even considered the possibility that state institutions would
one day adopt affirmative action racial quotas designed to repair the damages of past
segregation").
314. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 33, at 81 (asserting that "those who ratified it intended
black equality").

315. See, e.g., id. at 82 ("Since equality and segregation were mutually inconsistent,
though the ratifiers did not understand that, both could not be honored.").
316. See generally DWORKIN, supra note 33, at 294-301 (asserting that the writings of
Robert Bork fail to assume a consistent position regarding the level of abstraction at which
to identify the original understanding when applying the Equal Protection Clause to public
segregation and the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause to capital punishment).
317. Imagine, for example, a victim of an aggravated assault who, as a result, was in a
coma and on extraordinary life support in a state hospital, but with no chance of recovery.
Suppose that the state wanted to disconnect the life support to allow the victim to die so that
the assailant could be charged with murder. The state could not deprive the victim of life
without due process of law.
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in the Eighth Amendment, which, as we have seen, does not bar a
different conclusion about whether capital punishment infringes
that general principle today. The references would become irrelevant but not insensible if all the states and the federal legislature
decided to abolish capital punishment. Likewise, they would become
merely irrelevant but not insensible ifthe Supreme Court abolished
capital punishment under the Eighth Amendment.
2. The Death Penalty Does Not Violate the Eighth Amendment
Because Societal Consensus FavorsIts Use
The Supreme Court has concluded that the prohibition on cruel
and unusual punishments builds on "the evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."31 On this
view, the provision can proscribe punishments that states used
commonly at the time of the founding.319 The approach also
contemplates, however, limits on the ability of the Court to strike
down punishments. Widespread statutory endorsement of the death
penalty and its occasional imposition 20 imply that a societal
consensus has not developed against it.321 For this reason,
retentionists can argue that the punishment does not violate the
Eighth Amendment.322
This contention simply turns a blind eye to racial discrimination
in the imposition of death penalties. Evidence that a majority of the
society supports the death penalty should not determine its
constitutionality if odious prejudices mar its use. Professor
318. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311-12 (2002) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86,
101 (1958)) (internal quotation marks omitted); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)
(plurality opinion) (quoting Trop).
319. See, e.g., SCALIA, supra note 33, at 39-40 (noting that the Eighth Amendment
standard exemplifies that "what the Constitution meant yesterday it does not necessarily
mean today").
320. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
321. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 301, at 34 (noting that the death penalty "has been
supported continuously by the vast majority of the people of the United States from the
founding of the nation up to the present day").
322. See, e.g., Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 378-79 (1989) (plurality opinion of
Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and White and Kennedy, JJ.) (asserting that societal
opposition to the death penalty must be reflected objectively through laws and sentencing
verdicts and, based on that standard, the death penalty is permissible for those whose
offenses occurred when they were at least sixteen).
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Amsterdam noted this point in his argument before the Supreme
32 3 a companion case to Furman.
324 He
Court inAikens v. California,
urged that the proper question under the Eighth Amendment was
"whether a punishment ifevenhandedly appliedwould be unacceptable to contemporary standards of decency."3 25 Of course, Professor
Amsterdam concluded that society would reject a fair death penalty.
The Supreme Court would confront the problem more directly by
acknowledging that racial discrimination in capital sentencing
violates the deserts limitation and then simply ask about the
remedy. The question posed by Professor Amsterdam ingeniously
connected the racial-discrimination problem to the Court's thenexisting Eighth Amendment pronouncements. The answer to the
question, however, was not as clear as Professor Amsterdam
indicated. Faced with an imaginary choice between racially neutral
application and abolition, society might well choose racially neutral
application. This conclusion should not matter. The crucial question
is not what society would choose if forced to choose, but whether the
Supreme Court can force states to choose. We have seen that the
Court cannot feasibly impose such a choice. The Court can only
solve the problem through abolition.
Although not essential to the argument, asking directly about the
remedy also would not seriously extend the Court's past approach
to resolving abolition questions. A societal consensus exists against
imposing the death penalty on the undeserving; the Court's postFurman application of the Eighth Amendment to capital punishment implicitly builds on this notion. 26 In abolishing the death
penalty, the Court would give force to society's aspirations at this
higher level of generality. The Court would confront objective
evidence that the death penalty is still widely allowed and occasionally imposed for murder, just as the death penalty was still widely
allowed and occasionally imposed on retarded offenders when the
Court recently rejected the death penalty for retarded murderers in
Atkins v. Virginia.327 The inability to cure the racial discrimination
323. 406 U.S. 813 (1972).
324. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
325. MELTSNER, supra note 2, at 269.
326. See supra notes 272-79 and accompanying text.
327. 536 U.S. 304 (2002). As Justice Scalia noted in dissent inAtkins, using even a flawed
counting method employed by the majority, at least twenty states still allowed the death
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that infects deserts findings underlying many death sentences
provides grounds to reject the death penalty just as the belief that
some retarded offenders who received death sentences did not
deserve that sanction explained the decision in Atkins.3 28
3. A Requirement of Racial Neutrality in the Use of Capital
Punishment Would Also Have to Apply to the Use of All Criminal
Punishment and Would Undermine the CriminalJustice System
In McCleskey, the Supreme Court concluded that the petitioner's
Eighth Amendment challenge to his death sentence actually
attacked "our entire criminal justice system." 2 9 McCleskey claimed
that racial discrimination in Georgia's capital selection system
made his death sentence arbitrary and capricious in violation of the
Court's prior Eighth Amendment rulings on capital sentencing. °
The Court noted that a variety of irrelevant factors beyond race
could also influence capital sentencing, including "membership in
other minority groups," "gender," or "any arbitrary variable, such
as the defendant's facial characteristics, or the physical attractiveness of the defendant or the victim." 33 ' Likewise, the Court noted
that irrelevant factors relating to other actors in the criminal
justice system, such as defense attorneys orjudges, could influence
sentences.3 2 Most importantly, the Eighth Amendment applies not
only to capital punishment but to all criminal penalties. Hence, the
penalty for retarded offenders whenAtkins came before the Court. See id. at 342 (noting that
only "18 States-less than half (47%) of the 38 States that permit capital punishment" had

enacted statutes that in some way restricted the execution of the retarded).
328. In Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977), the Court also abolished the death penalty

for rape despite the absence of convincing evidence of a societal conclusion that the death
penalty was virtually always too much punishment for rape. While noting relevant

legislation and the actions of jurors, the Coker plurality ultimately concluded that, "the
Constitution contemplates that in the end our own judgment will be brought to bear on the
question of the acceptability of the death penalty under the Eighth Amendment." Id. at 597.
The Atkins Court also cited this language from Coker. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312.
329. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 315 (1987).
330. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner at 44, McCleskey (No. 84-6811), reprinted in 171
LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 597 (1988) ("[N]othing could be more arbitrary within the meaning of
the Eighth Amendment than a reliance upon race in determining who should live and who
should die.").
331. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 316-17 (footnotes omitted).
332. See id. at 317.
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Court concluded that granting McCleskey's claim would logically
require granting corresponding claims in the noncapital context,
which would effectively shut down our criminal justice system. 3
The answer to this fear of "too much justice"33 4 is simply that the
Court could limit the Eighth Amendment challenge to capital
selection. The McCleskey majority's effort to suggest an unavoidable
slippery slope into noncapital cases was vacuous. All slippery slope
arguments warrant skepticism because they are themselves not
strictly logical.3 3 The slippery slope claim rests "on the risk of
mistakes in interpreting the meaning of an opinion in the instant
case resulting from problems like linguistic imprecision in the
formulation of rules and limited comprehension by subsequent
decisionmakers." 336 As long as an understandable line can be drawn
across the spectrum of cases involved, future decision makers would
likely comprehend it. In the Eighth Amendment context, there is an
easily defined line between capital and noncapital cases that future
courts would not likely misinterpret.
The Supreme Court could also easily justify the distinction.3 7
The Court has often noted the uniqueness of death as a punishment
both because of its severity and finality from the perspective of the
defendant, and because of the difficult moral questions it raises
from the perspective of society. 8 The distinction explains, among
333. See id. at 314-15 ("McCleskey's claim, taken to its logical conclusion, throws into
serious question the principles that underlie our entire criminal justice system.").
334. Id. at 339 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
335. See Frederick Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 HARV. L. REV. 361,382 (1985) ("It is true
that the phenomenon of the slippery slope is not strictly logical and that a slippery slope
effect is always in logical and linguistic theory eliminable.").
336. Scott W. Howe, Jury Fact-Finding in Criminal Cases: Constitutional Limits on
Factual Disagreements Among Convicting Jurors, 58 Mo. L. REV. 1, 23 (1993) (footnote
omitted).
337. But see Dolinko, supra note 26, at 582 (asserting that "the discrimination argument
has nothing to do with any special features of death as a punishment").
338. In Beck v. Alabama, the Court stated:
[Death is a different kind of punishment from any other which may be imposed
in this country.... From the point of view of the defendant, it is different in both
its severity and its finality. From the point of view of society, the action of the
sovereign in taking the life of one of its citizens also differs dramatically from
any other legitimate state action. It is of vital importance to the defendant and
to the community that any decision to impose the death sentence be, and
appear to be, based on reason rather than caprice or emotion.
447 U.S. 625, 637-38 (1980) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Regarding the moral complications raised by the involvement of the state in the process
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other things, why the Eighth Amendment requires an individualized sentencing hearing in capital cases but not in other criminal
cases,3 39 and why a more stringent proportionality rule applies in
the capital as opposed to the noncapital context.3 40 As we have seen,
these decisions reflect a strict deserts limitation in the capital
context that does not apply elsewhere,3 4 1 which also explains why
racial discrimination in capital sentencing warrants a more serious
response. Racial discrimination undermines the desert determinations that are crucial in capital sentencing. Precisely because death
sentences, induced in part by racial prejudice, infringe the deserts
limitation, they violate the Eighth Amendment. 4 2
4. Perfection in CapitalSentencing Is Impossible, and the
Eighth Amendment Should Be Understood to Make Reasonable
Allowance for the Influence of Racial Bias and Other Improper
Factors
A system of capital selection involving human arbiters inevitably
will reflect somewhat the irrational biases of those actors. 43

of capital selection and execution, see generally Lempert, supra note 38, at 1185-87 (noting
that, because of the long and divisive public process that precedes them, "[sitate executions
not only destroy our consensus as to what fate is deserved, but they also eliminate the
possibility of honor.").
339. See, e.g., Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978) (opinion of Scalia, J.) (plurality
opinion) (noting that although individualized consideration is not required at the sentencing
stage in a noncapital case, "[wihen the choice is between life and death, the risk [of failing
to consider relevant mitigating circumstances] is unacceptable and incompatible with the
commands of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments'); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428
U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (plurality opinion) (noting that "[d]eath, in its finality, differs more from
life imprisonment than a 100-year prison term differs from one of only a year or two" and,
consequently, "there is a corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the
determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case").
340. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 994 (1991) (asserting that, because death
is different, proportionality review would occur in capital cases although not in noncapital
cases); DRESSLER, supranote 270, at 43-50 (describing the different proportionality analyses
the Court has applied in the two contexts).
341. See supra Part IV.A.
342. Cf Latzer, supranote 71, at 1175 (noting that ifa death sentence were deserved, the
uniqueness of death sentences would not matter because "[al rarely enforced, but otherwise
deserved, death sentence is no more cruel than a rarely enforced life sentence").
343. See COYNE & ENTZEROTH, supranote 38, at 198 ("death penalty proponents claim that
racial discrimination is inevitable").
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Realism forecloses perfection in the use of capital punishment.3 4
Consequently, one could argue that the Eighth Amendment must
allow reasonable levels of racial discrimination. Some retentionists
have implied further that the 345
levels of racial discrimination that
currently exist are reasonable.
This contention fails, however, to suggest any basis for imposing
a constitutional limit. The argument is nothing more than an
apologia for racial discrimination. In the past, opponents of change
did not prevail with arguments that racial prejudice was "inevitable' or not 'constitutionally unacceptable' in education, housing, [or]
employment." 3 In the criminal context, the argument did not
rationalize racial discrimination in the selection of jurors. 4 7 The
widespread nature of racial prejudice in American society is simply
not a reason in itself to accept racism as reasonable.3 4 8
The contention also fails to account for the special nature of
capital punishment. In capital sentencing, we should permit less
error than in virtually all, if not all, other contexts. As we have
seen, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that the death
penalty is qualitatively different in its severity, finality, and moral
implications from any other punishment imposed by the criminal
justice system.3 49 Also, retentionists cannot establish that the
punishment has any special penological value over incarceration.35 0
344. See, e.g., Steven Semeraro, Responsibility in Capital Sentencing, 39 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 79, 96 (2002) ("Given that individuals organize their thoughts through the
generalizations of language, it is possible that we cannot even really imagine what a truly
consistent or individuating system would be like, much less actually create one.") (footnote
omitted).
345. See, e.g., Rothman & Powers, supranote 21, at 7 (contending that the condemnation
of current selection systems based on racial discrimination builds in part on "the belief that
extra-legal variables must be entirely absent from the ... system for it to be legitimate"); van
den Haag, The Ultimate Punishment, supra note 27, at 1664 (asserting that "the Supreme
Court has ...
provided for ...
equality as much as possible" and that "[slome inequality is
indeed unavoidable in ...
any system").
346. See Bright, supra note 40, at 474.
347. See supranotes 211-12 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court decisions
on preventing racial discrimination in jury composition).
348. See, e.g., Bryan A. Stevenson & Ruth E. Friedman, DeliberateIndifference: Judicial
Tolerance of Racial Bias in CriminalJustice, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 509, 527 (1994) ("[It
is ...
necessary and essential to the moral authority of the law and the courts that such an
expectation" that society will 'eliminate racial bias in its justice system ... be articulated and
enthusiastically pursued.").
349. See supra notes 338-40 and accompanying text.
350. While retentionists are accustomed to arguing that the absence ofutilitarian benefits
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The available social-science evidence fails to indicate that capital
punishment helps to deter crime. 351 Its non-use in many states
alone casts doubt on its deterrent value. As for its retributive
function, the very existence of race discrimination undermines
many of the deserts judgments that supposedly justify death
sentences as appropriate retribution.352 These concerns about the
propriety of capital punishment weigh against accepting much
racial discrimination in its application.
The racial disparities in capital selection are also quite pronounced, which makes overlooking them unpalatable. For example,
the Baldus Study from Georgia revealed that, on average, a
defendant's chances of receiving a death sentence grew by 4.3 times
if his victim was white rather than black.353 The magnitude of this
effect finds useful comparison with the effect of smoking cigarettes
on coronary heart disease, a relationship now widely accepted as
causal and strong. The social-science evidence indicates that,
controlling for age, smokers are only "1.7 times more likely to die of
coronary artery disease than nonsmokers." 354 The race-of-victim

effect identified in the Baldus study is not accurately thought of as
marginal in light of this information. The Baldus finding and those
from a variety of other studies revealing pronounced levels of racial
from the death penalty is unproven, the burden of proof should shift where the question is

whether to overlook flaws in the administration of the sanction. Retentionists should prove,
seemingly by compelling evidence, that capital punishment serves a critical function if we
are to accept serious racial discrimination in its application. Retentionists cannot meet this
burden. See, e.g., Arthur J. Goldberg & Alan M. Dershowitz, Declaringthe Death Penalty

Unconstitutional,83 HARV. L. REV. 1773, 1797 (1970) (asserting that "when the burden of
justification is shifted to the state,' the state is unable to show a "compelling reason to
believe that a legitimate purpose of the criminal law is more effectively served by the death
penalty than by a less severe punishment").
351. See generally Lempert, supra note 38, at 1196-1224. See also id. at 1223 ("It may
never be possible for social scientists to be certain that the death penalty does not deter
homicide, but there is now enough research that fails to reveal deterrence that for purposes

of moral argument one must proceed as if the death penalty does not deter.") (footnotes
omitted); cf McAdams, supranote 27, at 839 ("[Tlhere is a reasonable basis for believing that

executions deter murders, but the evidence is far short of solid.").
352. See Lempert, supranote 38, at 1224 ("Retribution, despite an honest appeal to human
emotion, cannot justify a system of state executions inevitably tainted by mistake, bias, and
caprice.").
353. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
354. Samuel R. Gross, Race and Death: The Judicial Evaluation of Evidence of
Discriminationin Capital Sentencing, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1275, 1307 (1985) (footnote

omitted).
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discrimination make irrelevant the theoretical point that we should
accept some marginal levels of discrimination.
5. Nationwide Abolition of the Death Penalty Would Prevent
the Use of the Sanction in Some States Where Little Racial
DiscriminationArises in the Use of CapitalPunishment
A nationwide prohibition on the death penalty would respond
categorically to a racial-discrimination problem that varies among
jurisdictions. Death-penalty states differ significantly in the
aggressiveness with which they pursue death sentences... and,
therefore, in the number of undeserved death sentences that they
impose. While some have issued many death sentences and
executed dozens of persons, others maintain only a handful of
prisoners on death row and have not executed a person in
decades.5 6 In this latter group, unwarranted death penalties are,
by definition, rare. Retentionists could argue that imposing
nationwide abolition on grounds of racial discrimination would
inappropriately foreclose the threat of the death penalty in states
where racial bias matters little.
This complaint would not justify avoiding nationwide abolition.
The decision about abolition appropriately centers on the
practicalities of eliminating irrational discrimination from capital
sentencing in all states rather than on the theoretical possibility of
racially neutral selection systems or on whether an acceptable
system might exist somewhere. An extremely limited application of
capital punishment might produce sufficiently neutral selection.
Yet, states that impose the vast majority of death sanctions are not
likely to soon adopt such minimal-use plans voluntarily. Moreover,
the Supreme Court cannot feasibly enforce racial neutrality in
capital selection. 57

355. See generally Lofquist, supra note 96 (establishing a concept of death penalty
intensity to examine how aggressively states handle death penalty situations).
356. See supranote 35.
357. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 367 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing
for an individualized approach to determining the propriety of remedy); id. at 365
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("Like Justice Stevens, I do not believe acceptance of McCleskey's
claim would eliminate capital punishment in Georgia.").
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In proceeding on a state-by-state basis, the Court would face
great difficulty in articulating and enforcing decisional rules. The
Court would have to draw fairly arbitrary lines regarding when a
racial-discrimination problem was actionable versus only marginal.
Rulings against a state would imply, by definition, the possibility
of a remedy, which would create continual litigation over whether
remedial efforts sufficed. Rulings for a state would also lack
permanency because a state's pattern of death sentencing within
murder cases could continually evolve. More importantly, the logic
of the argument for a state-by-state approach would seem to carry
on down to a racial-category by racial-category approach and,
ultimately, to a case-by-case approach. This result would raise all
of the difficulties previously discussed regarding efforts to identify
individual cases in which the offender deserves death. 8 " The same
kinds of arguments to be made for resisting this individualized
approach by pursuing a categorical approach at the level of each
state would seem also to justify a categorical approach at the
national level.
A state-by-state approach would also either produce near
abolition or fail to achieve racial neutrality, neither of which is
desirable. On one hand, preserving the death penalty in a few
states in which it is virtually never used would tend to undermine
359
any claim that the sanction serves a valid penological purpose.
On the other hand, if the state-by-state approach did little to reduce
the nationwide use of the death penalty, it would also not likely
reduce the problem of unfounded deserts judgments influenced by
racial prejudice. 6 ° Categorical abolition would avoid these problems.
6. The Problem of RacialDiscriminationin CapitalSelection
has Ameliorated Since the Pre-FurmanEra and with More Time
Will Largely Disappear
Hope remains that racial discrimination will abate in American
society. Few would deny that improvements in race relations have
358. See supra text accompanying notes 251-59.
359. See supra notes 350-52 and accompanying text.
360. See supra Part IV.B.
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occurred since the Brown decision. In the capital-sentencing context
as well, the levels of racial discrimination have improved in some
areas since the pre-Furman era. The Baldus researchers, for
example, noted reduced racial discrimination against black
defendants in Georgia between pre- and post-Furman periods."6 1
Some of the changes are the result of Supreme Court rulings,
particularly abolition of the death penalty for rape in Coker.362 Some
of the improvements, however, seem to have resulted more from
changing attitudes among the populace than from regulation of
capital sentencing by the courts. 3" Retentionists could argue that
continuing improvements in race relations in the larger society will
further reduce the racial discrimination problem in the decades
ahead, foreclosing the need for abolition.
Hope for a color-blind society, however, is not a reason to ignore
racial discrimination in the use of the death penalty.3 64 Predictions
about the future of race relations are highly speculative, and the
racial disparities may well not decline significantly. Even if race
relations in the larger society progressed, the process of advancement and its translation to reduced racial prejudice in capital
selection would not likely proceed rapidly. Some retentionists have
acknowledged this reality.6 5 As we have seen, even relatively recent
361. See BALDUS ET AL., supra note 12, at 182 (noting a statewide decline in Georgia in
discrimination against black defendants between the pre- and post-Furmanperiods).
362. See, e.g., Steiker, supra note 224, at 1487.
Because black men who raped white women were extraordinarily more likely
to receive the death penalty than any other racial combination, Coker's
elimination of the death penalty for rape, although formally premised entirely
on grounds of proportionality, managed to eliminate the most racially
disproportionate use of capital punishment at the same time.
Id. (footnote omitted); see also McCord, supra note 4, at 548 (noting from the Baldus study
that the post-Furman Georgia system, as compared to the pre-FurmanGeorgia system,
"operat[es] less arbitrarily with respect to both overinclusion and underinclusion, and that
this improvement is likely due in significant part to the Court's regulatory efforts") (footnotes
omitted).
363. See, e.g., BALDUS ET AL., supra note 12, at 182-84 (attributing the reduction in
discrimination against black defendants largely to a shift among Georgians toward more
equal treatment of blacks rather than to post-Furmanstatutory changes in capital selection).
364. Also, I have noted that racial discrimination in capital selection is likely only
symptomatic of a broader tendency to rely on inappropriate factors in capital selection.
Waiting for an end to racial disparities will not mean that death sentences that are issued
are deserved.
365. See, e.g., Scheidegger, supra note 184, at 124 ("Racism is a cancer that infects all
aspects of government, including the criminal justice system. It will exist until the day the
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studies of capital selection have identified pronounced, unexplained
racial disparities. 6 6 Given the clear indications of the inability of
the courts to restrict racial discrimination in capital selection after
three decades of regulation, expecting the problem soon to disappear is far-fetched.36 7 Because death sentences influenced by racial
discrimination are undeserved, such hopes should not postpone a
solution.
CONCLUSION

The efforts of the Supreme Court to regulate capital sentencing
have failed to remedy the problem of racial discrimination. Numerous studies from a variety of states indicate that racial bias
continues to plague capital selection. The studies show consistent
and pronounced patterns of prejudice against those who kill white
victims. A significant percentage of the studies reveal additional
bias against black defendants. Variations exist among states
regarding the number of death sentences imposed each year and the
number and quality of studies that imply racial discrimination. The
studies together, however, reveal unexplained disparities correlating with race that are too pronounced and consistent to ignore.
When considered in light of the country's unfortunate history of
racial discrimination and the minimal safeguards in current
capital-selection schemes, the studies give reason for concern.
The federal courts are also ill-equipped to remedy the discrimination through regulation. All of the regulatory solutions that
commentators have suggested fail either because they assume a
level of centralized state control over capital selection that is

last bigot dies, a day not within the forseeable future.").
366. See supranotes 161-77 and accompanying text.
367. Hope for improvement could, nonetheless, cause the Supreme Court to avoid the
argument for abolition. Cf Grutterv. Bolinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2347 (2003) ("We expect that
25 years from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary to further the
interest (of diversity in higher education] approved today."). Given the present state of the

law under McCleskey, the lower courts justifiably can deny litigants the opportunity to
introduce evidence of racial discrimination in capital selection. The Supreme Court, likewise,
can deny certiorari on claims that would provide the opportunity to reconsider racial
discrimination as a grounds for abolition under the Eighth Amendment. Hence, the
argument for abolition based on racial discrimination is not likely to receive an airing in the
federal courts without a sympathetic Supreme Court.
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unattainable, or because they excessively thwart the use of capital
punishment and impose an administrative morass on the federal
courts. Remedies that aim to level-up or re-select so as to increase
or maintain current levels of use of capital punishment assume
untenable degrees of control over individual arbiters in the capitalselection process.3 68 Level-down remedies would mire the federal
courts in a morass of continuous litigation and produce de facto
near-abolition, further undermining the moral justification for
capital punishment. As a practical matter, only abolition could
feasibly solve the racial-discrimination problem.
Prevailing Eighth Amendment discourse has not clarified,
however, why unconscious racial discrimination in capital selection
should matter enough to justify abolition. The Supreme Court has
asserted that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause requires
"consistency" or "nonarbitrariness" in capital selection, but this
declaration does not lead to compelling arguments that racial
inconsistency warrants reprieving murderers who would otherwise
receive capital punishment.3 69 As retentionists have frequently
noted, a just death sentence becomes no less just because others
who also warrant that punishment are spared. If mere racial
inconsistency among those deserving death sentences were the
problem, we should feel badly for those murder victims whose
killers escape death, not the death-sentenced murderers who
receive their just deserts. On this view, the inconsistency would not
easily justify preventing even a single death sentence although no
other approach can remedy the inconsistency.
The problem with the prevailing discourse-and the reason racial
discrimination matters enough under the Eighth Amendment to
reverse death sentences-is that death sentences influenced by
racial bias are not deserved. Persons who are guilty of capital
murder do not for that reason alone warrant the death penalty. The
very purpose of the capital sentencing hearing required by the
Eighth Amendment is to ensure that all capital murderers who
receive death sentences deserve them. Although the Supreme Court
usually has avoided any suggestion that the Eighth Amendment
368. These level-up or re-selection proposals, including mandatory death sentencing, also
merely treat the racial-disparity symptoms without addressing the true problem of death
sentences based on ill-founded deserts findings.
369. See supra note 37.
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speaks to the substantive measure defining death eligibility, its
doctrines governing the use of capital punishment find explanation
in this deserts-limitation idea.3 70 This theory also helps us understand why racial discrimination invalidates death sentences
whether the discrimination is purposeful or unconscious, and
whether the discrimination is against black defendants, black
victims, or both. Neither the race of the victim nor of the offender
bears on the deserts of the capital defendant. Where racial discrimination of any sort helps produce a death sentence, the offender does
not deserve death.
Abolition is justified as the only feasible remedy. Many
retentionists would argue that abolition is inappropriate although
no other remedy can succeed. They would claim, for example,
that abolition ignores the original understanding of the Eighth
Amendment,3 7 ' the current societal consensus favoring capital
punishment, 2 and the possibility of future improvements in race
relations that could abate racial discrimination. 3 All of the
important arguments that retentionists offer, however, assume
that the problem is mere racial inconsistency among those
deserving death sentences. These arguments lose their power once
we understand racial discrimination as widely undermining the
deserts findings required by the Eighth Amendment to justify
capital punishment.

370.
371.
372.
373.

See supra Part IV.
See supra note 33.
See supra note 34.
See supra Part IV.C.6.

